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IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY OR INSECURITY?:  THE POTENTIAL INDEFINITE DETENTION 
OF NON-CITIZEN1 CERTIFIED TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
“Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that 
one be violated?”2
INTRODUCTION
The horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 left millions of people, both in the 
United States and throughout the world, feeling vulnerable in a way that we have never felt 
before.  The unprecedented acts of terror created a type of public fear that has not before been 
present with other national threats of security.  The immeasurable damage of the events to the 
human spirit and our sense of security left many individuals searching for reassurance from their 
governments that these types of atrocities could never, and would never, transpire again.  
Consequently, consistent with what has historically occurred immediately following most major 
1
 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002), defines “aliens” as all 
people who are not nationals of the United States.  It then uses the term “alien” throughout the 
Act consistently and frequently.  Because the term “alien” connotes dehumanizing qualities of 
strangeness and inferiority, this Comment will use the term “non-citizen” rather than “alien.”  
This term conveys essentially the same technical meaning without the potentially offensive 
associations.
2 See COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basker ed., 1953).  Abraham 
Lincoln was the first president to essentially ignore Congress’ power and freely direct the nation 
as a “dictator.”  Faced with the emergency of the Civil War, Lincoln enlarged the Army and 
Navy beyond the authorization of Congress and spent money without Congressional approval.  
In addition, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus which enable the executive branch to arrest 
“disloyal” citizens and anyone who sympathized with the South without a trial.  The Supreme 
Court justified President Lincoln’s extraordinary conception of executive power based upon the 
emergency circumstances.  See Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An 
Examination of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 455, 
465 (2002) (discussing the roles of different presidents in times of war and crisis).  
2terrorist events, legislatures around the world3 embarked on the task of passing tougher anti-
terrorism laws in a frenzy of activity.4
The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, under the premise of 
national security, responded to the events of September 11, 2001 by immediately enacting 
comprehensive responsive and reactionary legislation.  The measures adopted by the 
governments of these two nations, while allaying some of the fears of their citizens and possibly 
providing them with a greater sense of security without sacrificing their own liberty, have in turn 
sacrificed the liberty of non-citizens.  Among other things, this trade-off has provided the United 
States and the United Kingdom with the discretion and the authority to indefinitely detain those 
non-citizens certified as terrorists under the new legislation.5  This targeting of non-citizens 
3
 For example, several countries of the European Union, in addition to the United Kingdom 
which is at the focus of this Comment, passed anti-terrorism measures in the wake of September 
11, 2001.  France expanded the powers of police to search private property without a warrant and 
Germany engaged in religious profiling of suspected terrorists.  See Jeffery Rosen, Liberty is 
winning …so far, Congress and courts are resisting the Bush administration’s efforts to restrict 
civil liberties in the name of national security, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2002.
4 See Gregory C. Clark, History Repeating Itself: The (D)evolution of Recent British and 
American Antiterrorist Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 247- 48 (1999) (comparing the 
past efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to combat terrorism).  One of the 
memorable phrases that was coined during the troubles in Northern Ireland in the past is the 
“politics of the last atrocity.”  It refers to people taking advantage of the last atrocity to push a 
political agency or to score political points. See id.  Similarly, the following the Oklahoma City 
bombing in the United States the legislature passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act with the goal of making the United States a no-support-for-terrorism zone.  See id.  
See also supra note 40 (discussing terrorist events in the United States prior to September 11, 
2001).
5
 “Certified” means that either the Attorney General in the United States or the Secretary of 
Labor of the United Kingdom has deemed a particular individual in their respective countries as 
a suspected terrorist.  What is so striking about both the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 and 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is the tremendous power each piece of legislation 
placed in the discretion of the government to certify an individual as a terrorist, which leads to 
automatic preventative detention.  This certification does not require a court order and is 
permissible upon a reasonable belief held by the executive that the individual is a terrorist.  The 
certification of suspected terrorists will be discussed further in Part III of this Comment.
3through the use of anti-terrorism legislation by the governments of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, while not unprecedented or necessarily radical given the atrocities committed 
against the citizens of these nations,6 does however raise serious concerns regarding exactly how 
far these nations can proceed in the name of national security.    
6
 Historically, the governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom have curtailed 
civil liberties in times of national emergency, finding the state interest in national security to be 
paramount to competing interests. During World War I, the Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction of Eugene Debs for expressing his opposition to the war, refusing to recognize his 
violent anti-war advocacy as speech protected by the First Amendment.  See Debs v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).  See also Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding 
conviction of an individual for distributing anti-war circulars).  Likewise, during World War II 
following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Supreme Court upheld an Executive Order 
mandating the internment of more than 100,000 Japanese immigrants based on their ancestry, 
refusing to recognize their preventive detention as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945). And during the Cold War, the United 
States was quick to target anyone suspected of being associated with the Communist Party. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
Similarly, the United Kingdom has been quick to ignore and suspend civil liberties during 
periods of crisis.  During World War II, almost 2,000 persons, both citizens and non-citizens 
alike, were interned in the United Kingdom without formal charges and without trial.  PADDY 
HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY, PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
ACTS IN BRITAIN 45 (1993).  Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s ongoing struggle with 
terrorism in Northern Ireland has often resulted in the suspension of civil liberties during 
particularly unstable periods.  See generally id. (providing a history of the United Kingdom’s 
response to terrorism in Northern Ireland and discussing how these responses have resulted in the 
erosion of civil liberties);  DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (studying the legal conflicts and transitions 
between the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights). For example, during 
the infamous “Bloody Sunday,” British paratroopers killed innocent and unarmed protesters in 
Northern Ireland who were participating in a civil rights demonstration. See LAURA K. 
DONAHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1922-
2000 121 (2000); Clark, supra note 4, at 253.  After this horrific event, Ireland erupted in 
violence and chaos.  In response, the United Kingdom suspended the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland and resorted to direct control of the province.  See id. at 253-54.  In addition, the United 
Kingdom passed two important pieces of legislation, the Emergency Powers Act and the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act.  These Acts and their effect on civil liberties will be discussed in 
more detail in Part II of this Comment.
An in-depth examination of the curtailment of civil liberties of both the United States and 
the United Kingdom during times of crisis is well-beyond the scope of this Comment.  This issue 
has, however, been addressed by numerous other scholars.  For more information, see generally 
Mathews, supra note 2 (comparing the recent curtailment of civil liberties by President Bush 
4An in-depth complete analysis and summary of the extensive anti-terrorism legislation 
enacted in the United States and the United Kingdom after September 11, 2001 is well beyond 
the scope of this Comment and has been extensively discussed elsewhere.7  These legislative 
acts, while undoubtedly sudden responses of both governments to the terrorist attacks, served as 
catchalls for many initiatives, a majority of which are non-controversial.  This Comment will 
examine a select few of those sections of the United States United and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 20018 (Patriot 
with the past policies of notable United States Presidents); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. 
L.J. 953 (2002) (addressing the United States treatment of non-citizens during times of crisis, 
both past and present); JACKSON, supra (studying violations by the United Kingdom of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); 
HILLYARD, supra (exploring the powers of the United Kingdom during times of crisis and 
describing how the entire Northern Ireland community has been targeted and criminalized by 
these powers). 
7
 For a discussion of the Patriot Act in its entirety see generally Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking 
Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002) (discussing the 
various provisions of the Patriot Act and their potential consequences for civil liberties); 
Amnesty International, United States of America, Amnesty International’s Concerns Regarding 
Post September 11 Detentions in the USA, March 2002, available at www.amnesty.com 
(outlining various provisions of the Patriot Act and discussing their implications for civil 
liberties); Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002) (examining 
the Patriot Act’s expansion of government authority and its impact on civil liberties).  For an 
analogous discussion of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 see generally Virginia 
Helen Henning, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made a 
Valid Derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1263 (2002) (discussing whether the broad powers authorized to the United Kingdom under 
ATCSA are consistent with their obligations under the European Human Rights Convention); 
Amnesty International, United Kingdom, Rights Denied: the UK’s Response to 11 September 
2001, Sept. 5, 2002, available at  www.amnesty.com (expressing deep concern about serious 
human rights violations that have taken place as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s 
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States); Adam Tomkins, 
Legislating against Terror: The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, PUBLIC LAW,
2002, at 205 (discussing the various measures of ATCSA); Sadiq Khan, Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act 2001, SOLICITORS JOURNAL, Jan. 11, 2002, at 10; Michael Zander, The Anti-
Terrorism Bill—What Happened?, NEW LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 21, 2001, at 1880. 
8
 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. Law No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
5Act) and the United Kingdom’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 20019 (ATCSA) which 
have proven extremely controversial.  These provisions stand out as radical in the degree in 
which they sacrifice freedom in the name of national security.  More specifically, the focus will 
be limited to §§ 411 and 412 of the Patriot Act and Part 4 of ATCSA, which provide the 
governments of the United States and United Kingdom with extensive powers to take into 
custody and detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism.10  Each piece of legislation respectively 
enables the Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of State of the United 
Kingdom to certify any non-citizen whom he suspects to be a terrorist.11  Upon certification, the 
provisions which will be examined then require the mandatory detention of these individuals 
until the non-citizen is either ordered removed from the country or found not to be removable, 
and authorize the potential indefinite detention of these non-citizens who have been certified as 
terrorists.12
Part I of this Comment will introduce the advantages and disadvantages that accompany 
the various theories of mandatory detention.  Keeping these theories in mind, Part II will begin 
by examining the major points of difference between the governments of the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  An understanding of the structural differences between the two 
governments is essential before embarking on a comparison of their anti-terrorist legislation, 
both past and present.  This Part will then lay the statutory framework for the Patriot Act and 
ATCSA by providing a brief history of the indefinite detention of non-citizen suspected terrorists 
in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to September 11, 2001.   In examining the 
9
 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).  
10 See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, §§ 411, 412 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.); Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, §§ 21-30.
11 See id. at § 412; § 21.
6past efforts of these countries to combat terrorism prior to September 11, 2001 and by 
establishing exactly what the law was prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act and ATCSA, we 
can better understand the changes these pieces of legislation authorized.  
Part III will then outline and compare specific detention provisions of the Patriot Act and 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001which are at the crux of this Comment.  The 
comparison will first examine the definition of a terrorist and exactly what qualifies as a terrorist 
activity under each of the respected acts in an effort to explain precisely how a decision is made 
to certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.  This Part will then look at the implications of being 
certified a terrorist as it pertains to custody, release, and commencement of proceedings and 
analyze the detention provisions and the potential concerns that each piece of legislation raises.  
In addition, this Part will also demonstrate how each act purports to place a limitation on 
detention by examining the ability of certified terrorists under each piece of legislation to obtain 
judicial review of their certification.  Finally, this Part will examine and analyze the various 
arguments which have been made against each of the pieces of legislation.  As this Part will 
establish, while each act presumably limits the amount of time a certified non-citizen terrorist 
can be detained, a close reading reveals that indefinite detention is a possibility.  Nevertheless, 
despite the prospect of indefinite detention, this analysis and comparison of each piece of 
legislation will also illustrate just how reasoned a response the Patriot Act is to protect the United 
States from the threats of terrorists and terrorism.  On the contrary, as will be explained, ATCSA 
cannot be similarly justified.
Part IV will first posit how the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) would rule 
on the constitutionality of the detention provisions of the Patriot Act and similarly whether the 
12 See id. at § 412; §§ 21-29.
7European Court of Human Rights13 (European Court) would find that the United Kingdom, in 
enacting the detention provisions of ATCSA, has violated its obligation to protect human rights 
and democratic principles under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).14  While 
each court has yet to rule on such issues, their previous decisions with regards to the detention 
provisions enacted in past legislation and their decisions during times of national crisis can guide 
us in making such an inquiry.  Ultimately, the question for both the Supreme Court and the 
European Court is whether these governments can sacrifice the liberties of others for the 
purported security of the rest of their citizens.  While it is probable that the controversial 
provisions of the Patriot Act will be upheld by the Supreme Court, it is questionable as to 
whether the European Court would similarly uphold the detention provisions of ATCSA.  
Irrespective of how each court would rule, however, this Comment will conclude that the 
detention strategy is inherently flawed and is unlikely, at least in the long term, to achieve the 
goals of preventing another terrorist attack.  
Finally, this Comment will argue that despite the indisputable curtailment on the civil 
liberties of non-citizens under both acts, the detention provisions embodied in the Patriot Act 
represent a reasoned and proportionate response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, while 
those under ATCSA cannot be similarly justified.  Even though the Patriot Act has come under 
heavy fire in both the United States and throughout the world, in researching the state of liberty 
and security after September 11, it is astounding to observe how restrained the legal response of 
the United States appears when contrasted with that of the United Kingdom.  Although the 
13
 The European Court of Human Rights was established under Article 19 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The Court will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV of 
this Comment.
14
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
8United Kingdom was not directly attacked, the detention provisions of ATCSA are far more 
sweeping than those authorized under the Patriot Act.   In comparing the legislative responses of 
both the United States and the United Kingdom to the terrorist attacks it becomes apparent that 
while the Patriot Act is a rational legislative response which includes sufficient protections to 
defend those subject to the Patriot Act’s detention provisions, the unrestrained powers of the 
British government under ATCSA are neither strictly necessary, nor balanced, nor accompanied 
by adequate procedural safeguards to protect the rights of those detained under Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001.
I. THEORIES OF MANDATORY DETENTION
An appropriate starting point in the comparison of the detention provisions of the Patriot 
Act and ATCSA is a brief analysis of the basic theories which underlie the mandatory detention 
of non-citizens.  In this analysis, it is essential to compare the benefits of categorical, mandatory 
detention with the benefits of case-by-case determinations which take into consideration the 
particular individual’s potential threat to public safety and the person’s likelihood of 
disappearing altogether  Essentially, do the benefits of mandatory detention outweigh the costs?
First, mandatory detention saves money because it avoids the expense of individualized 
hearings.15  The government has limited resources and cannot afford to do a case- by- case 
adjudication of each non-citizen who is suspected of being a terrorist.16  Second, mandatory 
detention diminishes the possibility of errors that arise when a detention determination is done on 
a case-by- case basis.17  Predictions about the threat of a person to the public’s safety or the 
15
 Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 544 (1999).
16 Id. at 545-46.
17 Id.
9individual’s likeliness to disappearance are inherently risky.18  Often in the course of an 
individualized hearing, not all the evidence will be discovered or presented and the findings of 
fact may not be accurate.19  In essence, mandatory detention, by eliminating the risk of 
prosecutorial error, protects the public more thoroughly.  Finally, mandatory detention deters 
further immigration violations.20  It both advances the government’s interest in ensuring the 
removal of aliens who are ordered deported and sends a message to those non-citizens 
contemplating criminal or terrorist in the United States.21  Arguably, if suspected terrorists are 
aware that they could be detained indefinitely, they may be discouraged from attempting to enter 
the United States illegally or from filing frivolous asylum claims.22
Nevertheless, there are shortcomings to the abovementioned theories.  Inevitably, 
mandatory detention will lead to a number of false positives.23  In other words, some of the 
people detained may or may not be suspected terrorists.  Furthermore, these individuals may not 
pose any threat to the public’s safety and may not abscond upon release.  Some disadvantages 
include the deprivation of individual liberty; the inability to work and socialize; and isolation 
from friends, family, and the community.  In addition, the individual suffers an economic loss by 
being unable to work, which results in the loss of income tax revenue that the detained person’s 
employment would have generated, as well as the increased public costs of providing detention 
18 Id.
19 Id. at 546.
20 Id.
21 Id; see also Daniel R. Dinger, When We Cannot Deport, is it Fair to Detain?  An Analysis of 
the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(A)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim 
Procedures Governing Detentions, BYU L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
22
 Legomsky, supra note 15, at 546.
23 Id. at 545-46.
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and possibly supporting the detainee’s dependents through public assistance programs. 24  These 
losses combined constitute a great waste of both human and financial resources.25
On the other hand, and even more significantly, many individuals who do not fall 
squarely within any of the categories of persons who are automatically subject to mandatory 
detention may in fact still present a real danger of absconding or pose a real threat to public 
safety.26  Every time the INS is required to detain a person who in fact poses no threat or danger 
at all, it has one fewer detention spot available for a person who poses a threat and whom the 
INS would have had the discretion to detain.27 This factor is of great consequence.  At any one 
time, there are approximately 125,000 persons in removal proceedings, but the INS has only 
14,000 detention beds.28  To the extent that mandatory detention is intended to minimize false 
negatives, therefore, the strategy might even be counterproductive.29
Thus, it appears that in least in certain cases, mandatory detention serves a useful 
enforcement function.  There are, however, great drawbacks that accompany mandatory 
detention.  With the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory detention in mind, we now turn 
the statutory framework that existed in regards to the mandatory detention of non-citizens 
suspected of terrorism in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001.    
24 Id. at 546-47.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 547.




II. MANDATORY DETENTION OF NON-CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
A comparison of any type of legislation enacted by two independent governments must 
begin with a basic understanding of how each government works and an explanation of the 
fundamental differences between the two systems.  Unlike the United States, the United 
Kingdom does not have a supreme written Constitution and an established bill of rights.30  Thus, 
the United Kingdom is a unitary state with a parliament whose legislative power is, legally 
speaking, unfettered, since there is no over-riding written constitution limiting its powers, and no 
power in the courts to invalidate an Act of Parliament.31  In addition, the principle of separation 
of powers, while underlying the structure of the United States government, is unheard of within 
the British system.32  In the absence of a federal system of government, the United Kingdom 
merges the functions of the executive and the legislature and does not provide the power of 
judicial review of primary legislation.33
These differing frameworks, more specifically, the absence of a power of judicial review 
of primary legislation, significantly affect the breadth of legislation and the powers afforded to 
30 See Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified 
International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 695 (1999); Roberta Smith, 
America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Response, 5 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 249, 283 (1997); D.G.T. Williams, Aspects of Equal Protection in 
the United Kingdom, 59 TULANE L. REV. 959, 960 (1985).  For a more in-depth examination of 
the nature and the source of the unique constitution of the United Kingdom see Douglas W. 
Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329 (2002).
31 See David Bonner, United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism, in
WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 171-72 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 
1993).  For an in-depth analysis of British law, the practice of the constitution and the overall 
structure of the government of the United Kingdom, see generally A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. 
EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1997).
32 See Carberry, supra note 30, at 695.
33 Id.
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government officials.34  This is clearly apparent and important when examining the anti-
terrorism legislation enacted by the two governments over the years.  Due to the absence of a 
formalized written constitution or a formal bill of rights, British law has consistently granted 
more power to its government to control terrorism.35  This is because, as previously discussed, in 
the United Kingdom there is essentially a single principle, parliamentary sovereignty, which 
allows Parliament, technically the monarch, Lords, and Commons, unlimited power to alter both 
the substance and procedure of government.36  This has resulted in the enactment of numerous 
specific anti-terrorism measures in response to the ongoing conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants in Northern Ireland.37  Nevertheless, the power is not unchecked.  The European 
Court of Human Rights monitors the British anti-terrorism provisions and places pressure on the 
government to respect basic human rights and liberties.38
34 Id.  Even in the absence of judicial review, however, British judges are familiar with the 
exercise of a leading constitutional rule: the early strands of authority for modern concepts of 
judicial review date back from seventeenth-century England.  For a further discussion of the 
concept of judicial review in the United Kingdom see Williams, supra note 30, at 964.  See also
BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 31, at 803-29.  
35 See Carberry, supra note 30, at 695.  Examples of this type power granted to the British 
government to combat terrorism will be discussed in more detail in Part II.B of this Comment.
36 See Barry Jones & Michael Keating, Nations, Regions, and Europe: The UK Experience, in
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONS 89 (Barry Jones & Michael Keating, eds., 1995).
37 See id.  For an examination of the vast legislation passed by the United Kingdom in an effort 
to address the conflict in Northern Ireland see generally DONAHUE, supra note 6 (discussing the 
exercise of extraordinary state power by the United Kingdom in Ireland and the repeated 
codification of emergency powers as a means to retain control over Ireland.)  In addition, Part 
II.B of this Comment will provide a summary of the United Kingdom’s anti-t errorism legislation 
prior to September 11, 2001. 
38 See Carberry, supra note 30, at 695; Smith, supra note 30, at 283.  The rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights are binding on the United Kingdom as the United Kingdom has ratified 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) and fully accepted its control mechanism.  Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, although 
obligated under ECHR, has consistently violated the treaty.  For an in-depth analysis of the 
United Kingdom and its various violations of ECHR see generally JACKSON, supra note 6 
(closely examining select violations of ECHR by the United Kingdom).
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Conversely, the United States has historically addressed terrorism on a less formalized 
basis than the United Kingdom.39  Instead of creating specific anti-terrorism legislation, the 
United States has generally incorporated anti-terrorism measures into pre-existing laws.40  While 
the lack of explicit anti-terrorism legislation can partially be attributed to our unique government 
structure, it is primarily the consequence of the United States’ limited exposure to domestic 
terrorism.  Unlike the British, it was not until the 1990s that Americans were attacked at home 
and realized that they were no longer insulated from terrorism within their borders.  Prior to this 
time, the government could not justify, nor did it need to enact, anti-terrorist legislation at the 
expense of civil liberties and rights.   Beginning with the bombing on the World Trade Center in 
1993 and culminating with the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, however, the government 
enacted comprehensive legislation which would address terrorism both domestically and 
internationally.41  These tragedies committed on our own soil brought our vulnerabilities to the 
forefront and brought home to Americans the reality that they too are susceptible to acts of 
terrorism.  While it would be another six years until the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks, 
these events resulted in a dramatic shift in the attitudes of both the American people and 
Congress towards terrorism.  
Irrespective of the structural differences of the governments of the United States and the 
United Kingdom and regardless of the anti-terrorism legislation enacted by each of these 
governments in the past, it is probable that nothing could have prepared either nation for the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.   Before focusing on the legislative reactions to 
39 See Smith, supra note 30, at 283-84.
40 Id.
41 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW POLICY 843 (2002).  Although a 
United States citizen perpetrated the attack on the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma 
14
September 11, 2001, however, to better explain how the newly granted detention powers 
authorized by the Patriot Act and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 have altered the 
landscape of non-citizen detention law in the United States and the United Kingdom, it is useful 
to first survey the rules governing detention as they existed prior to September 11, 2001 as well 
as to examine the key judicial decisions interpreting and applying them.  Only then can we 
contemplate whether these governments have proceeded too far in sacrificing the freedoms of 
non-citizens in the name of national security.
A.  The Mandatory Detention of Non-Citizen Terrorists in the United States Prior to September 
11, 2001
Beginning in the 1950s and lasting through the 1980s, the legal structure governing the 
detention of non-citizens was relatively clear and understood.  First, a critical distinction was 
made between resident non-citizens who had obtained entry into the United States, but who had 
yet to qualify for naturalization (including both legal and illegal resident non-citizens), and 
excludable non-citizens who had been detained at the border (including non-citizens who had 
been paroled into the United States).42  If a non-citizen was deemed excludable, and thus was 
stopped at the port of entry, the individual could be detained indefinitely.43  Conversely, if the 
City, Congress seized the opportunity to enact broad terrorism legislation to quell the public’s 
fear of both citizen and non-citizen terrorists alike.  See id.
42 See M. Gavan Montague, Should Aliens be Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231?  
Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1439, 1441-42 (2001).  Under INA § 212(d)(5), the Attorney General has the discretion to 
“parole” a non-citizen into the United States temporarily.  Until 1980 the parole provision was 
often used to allow groups of refugees into the United States for indefinite periods.  Today the 
provision is typically used to either enable non-citizens to come to the United States temporarily 
for urgent personal reasons or to allow applicants for admission to avoid detention pending 
determinations of admissibility.  A grant of parole, however, is not considered an admission.  See
LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 137.
43 See Harvard Law Review Association, Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of 
Deportable Aliens, 155 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2002) [hereinafter Plight of the Tempest -
Tost]; David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The 
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non-citizen was found deportable, meaning that the non-citizen had already procured entry into 
the United States, he could only be held for six months.44  This distinction was extremely 
important because at that time it was widely held that the Constitution afforded greater rights to 
non-citizens already in the United States than to those who had only just arrived at the border.45
After the expiration of this six-month period, the deportable non-citizen could be released.46  The 
release of the non-citizen, however, was often conditioned on certain supervision and reporting 
requirements.47
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 52 (2001).  See also United States 
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (ruling that excludable non-citizens had 
no right of a judicial audit, applying independent constitutional standards, of the procedures used 
in exclusion proceedings: “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”);  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206 (1953) (authorizing the indefinite detention of a non-citizen on Ellis Island).
44 See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1919; Martin, supra note 43, at 52.
45 See Martin, supra note 43, at 52.
46 See id.  Several cases found an equitable exception suspending the running of the six-month 
period id the non-citizen in anyway delayed the process of securing traveling documents.  See, 
e.g., Dor v. District Director, 891 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1989); Balogun v. INS, 9 F.3d 347, 
351 (5th Cir. 1993).
47
 An example of immigration parole can be best understood through the example of the 
Marielitos.  In 1980 the Cuban government opened up their port of Mariel for American citizens 
or residents to come and retrieve their family members.  In addition, the Cuban government 
emptied their prisons and placed many ex-prisoners on boats to the United States.  The ensuing 
boatlift brought over 120,000 Cubans to the United States.  Upon arrival, these non-citizens were 
excludable, but the political situation did not enable the United States to return them to Cuba.  As 
the sheer number of people made it impossible for the INS to process each non-citizen, virtually 
all of the Marielitos were released, but on immigration parole.  Problems with the indefinite 
detention of these individuals arose, however, when these Marielitos violated the conditions of 
their parole and began committing crimes after their release.  While the Supreme Court never 
ruled on the detention of these individuals, numerous District Courts upheld the indefinite 
detention of the Marielitos.  See Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997); Garcia- Mir v. 
Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 
1984).   For more information on the plight of the Marielitos see generally MARIO A. RIVERA, 
DECISION AND STRUCTURE: U.S. REFUGEE POLICY IN MARIEL CRISIS (1991) (examining the 
Cuban boatlift and its catastrophic consequences for the United States); see also LEGOMSKY, 
supra note 41, at 61-65.
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 In 1988, however, the statutory picture became considerably more complicated when 
Congress began to mandate the detention of particular undesirable non-citizens.  For example, in 
response to public outrage over high crime rates and increased drug consumption, Congress 
enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198848 (ADAA), which amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act49 (INA), to mandate detention of any alien convicted of an “aggravated 
felony.”50
1. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
ADAA required the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) to hold non-citizens in 
detention throughout deportation hearings and until actual removal.51  As one could expect, this 
legislation was controversial and was consequently challenged by non-citizens who were 
lawfully admitted prior to the enactment of ADAA and who had finished serving their criminal 
sentences.52  These individuals were now not only subject to deportation, but also faced the 
possibility of potential indefinite detention as a result of their previous criminal convictions.  
Many courts struggled with ADAA and split on the validity of this legislation, with only a few 
upholding the legislation and many more holding that the non-citizens were entitled to an 
individualized consideration of release.53  Shortly thereafter, Congress bowed to pressure and 
48
 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
49 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002).
50 Id. § 7343(a)(4) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)).  The ADAA defined aggravated felonies as 
crimes involving murder, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices, 
and attempts or conspiracies to commit such crimes in the United States.  Id. § 7342 (amending 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)).  See also Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating 
Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 480-81 (2001) 
(discussing the effects of the ADAA on immigration law and deportation proceedings). 
51
 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7343(a)(4) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)).
52 See Martin, supra note 43, at 61.
53 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the statute violated both 
substantive and procedural due process by denying the non-citizen any opportunity to prove that 
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liberalized the policy slightly by allowing the release of non-citizens who had been legally 
admitted into the United States and who could demonstrate that they did not pose a flight risk or 
danger to the community.54  Even with the amendments, however, the statute still permitted, and 
in some cases required, post-order detention of non-citizens beyond the six-month period for 
those aggravated felons who could not be removed.55  Furthermore, those non- citizens who were 
not lawfully admitted, or who were excludable, had no right to attempt to demonstrate 
qualification for release. 56   Nevertheless, the decisions considering whether these detentions 
he was neither likely to abscond or a danger to the community); Va Peng Joe v. Thornburgh, 
1990 WL 167457 (D.Mass.1990) (striking down the statute on both substantive and procedural 
due process grounds); Kellman v. District Director, 750 F.Supp 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(invalidating the statute). But see Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F.Supp. 725 (E.D.Va.1990) 
(finding that the statute did not violate substantive due process because the plenary power 
doctrine of Congress over immigration law confined the court to searching for a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason for the restriction and that given the urgency of the war on drugs, 
this reason was easy to find).  To understand why the Morrobel decision was decided in this 
way, it is important to note that the court in this case characterized the plaintiff’s constitutional 
argument as substantive, and not procedural.  The person had a bail hearing and he had requested 
relief which had been denied by the immigration judge.  Therefore, the court concluded, what the 
plaintiff was really challenging was the substantive validity of the aggravated felony preclusion 
and that there was no procedural due process issue and thus no need to determine whether 
individualized hearing were constitutionally required.  The court, only having to address the 
plaintiff’s substantive arguments, was confined to the plenary power doctrine and only needed to 
find a facially and bona fide reason for the restriction.  Given the urgency of the war on drugs, 
this reason was not difficult to find.  See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (setting 
forth the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard utilized by the court in Morrobel); 
see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 93-94.
54 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat. 5049 
(former 8 U.S.C. § 1252).  See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 94; THOMAS ALEXANDER 
ALEINKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 898 (1998); Plight of 
the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1920; Stacy J. Borisov, Give Me Liberty or Give Me 
Deportation: The Indefinite Detention of Non-Removable, Criminal Aliens, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 183, 191 (2001). 
55 See ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 898.
56 Id.
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were lawful were often upheld based on the fact that individualized consideration had been given 
to the non-citizen’s release.57
As a result of the amendments to ADAA, the rules mandating the detention of non-
citizens appeared to be somewhat unclear.  No longer was there any bright-line rule requiring the 
release of a detained non-citizen after six months.  The new rules governing the detention of both 
deportable non-citizens and excludable non-citizens purported to authorize indefinite detention 
provided that there was an opportunity for regular review of the detention decision.  Even this 
rule, however, was not entirely clear.  It was not until 1996, with the passing of both 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act58 (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act59 (IIRIRA) that Congress abruptly changed its direction and began 
to clarify the rules governing the mandatory detention of non-citizens.   
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Following the Oklahoma City Bombing, an unrelenting and fiercely resolved Congress 
capitalized on the public’s concern with terrorism in passing AEDPA in April of 1996.60
Congress seized this opportunity to come down hard on criminal non-citizens, especially those 
who were suspected terrorists.61  This legislation, along with IIRIRA enacted later in the same 
year, radically altered the statutory framework which governed the detention of non-citizens.  
57 Id. See also Hernandez-Ebank v. Caplinger, 951 F.Supp. 99 (E.D.La. 1996) (finding no 
constitutional violation in holding a non-citizen indefinitely because the non-citizen had entered 
lawfully and had received a bond hearing).
58
 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L No. 104-132, 110 
Stat 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
59
 Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L No 104-208,  
110 Stat 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
60 See Clark, supra note 4, at 248.
61
 While those responsible for the Oklahoma City Bombing were American citizens, Congress 
still used this opportunity to come down hard all terrorists, and in particular, non-citizen 
terrorists. 
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Combined, AEDPA and IIRIRA extended mandatory detention to several other major categories: 
(1) almost anyone who was inadmissible or deportable on crime-related grounds (not just 
aggravated felons); (2) those who were inadmissible or deportable on terrorism grounds; (3) 
most arriving passengers (i.e., those non-citizens who had yet to be admitted into the United 
States); and (4) individuals who were awaiting the execution of final removal orders.62  In 
addition, under both AEDPA and IIRIRA, judicial review of immigration decisions was severely 
restricted.63
AEDPA significantly impacted the rules governing the detention of non-citizens in three 
important ways.  First, it eliminated the exception provided under the previous law for the 
release of those aliens previously admitted lawfully who were determined by the INS to pose no 
threat to the community.64  In other words, lawfully admitted convicted aggravated felons were 
no longer entitled to an individualized consideration of release and could potentially be detained 
indefinitely.  Essentially, this marked a return to the unrelenting detention mandate which was 
enacted by ADAA in 1988.  Second, AEDPA vastly expanded the definition of an aggravated 
felon and thus subjected a broader category on non-citizens to mandatory detention during 
removal proceedings and thereafter until repatriation.65  Consequently, more aliens were subject 
62 See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 255 
(b)(2)(A), 236(c)(1)(A,B,C,D), 241(a)(1,2,3), 66 Stat. 163, 177 (1952) (current version at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (2000)).
63 See id.  For a full examination of how AEDPA and IIRIRA limited judicial review of 
immigration actions see David Cole, No Clear Statement: An Arguments for Preserving Judicial 
Review of Removal Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 427 (1998).
64 See Borisov, supra note 54, at 191-92.
65 See id. at 191;  see also Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(43) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43) (2000)) (outlining those crimes which are deemed to be aggravated felonies). While 
the list of aggravated felonies is long, some examples include murder, rape, sexual abuse of a 
minor, illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive 
devices or in explosive materials.  See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(43) (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)). 
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to deportation based upon their classification as an aggravated felon.66  Finally, in addition to 
expanding the definition of aggravated felony, AEDPA made nearly all deportable aliens with a 
criminal record ineligible for a relief provision that had previously allowed seven-year lawful 
permitted residents who committed crimes to seek discretionary relief from deportation from an 
immigration judge by showing rehabilitation, family or community ties, and other favorable 
factors.67  In sum, because AEDPA eliminated the exception under previous law which allowed 
the INS to release those non-citizens previously lawfully admitted if they were deemed to pose 
no danger to the community or risk of flight, the INS lost its discretion to release most criminal 
non-citizens, irrespective of their removal prospects.68
Many of the changes under AEDPA did not remain in effect for long.  IIRIRA, passed 
only a few months after AEDPA, was responsible for amending the INA and subjecting a 
broader category of non-citizens to mandatory detention during removal proceedings and 
thereafter until repatriation.69  Essentially, under IIRIRA, if a non-citizen had been convicted of 
an aggravated felony, upon completion of his prison sentence, he could then be placed into the 
custody of the INS through an order of the Attorney General.70  The Attorney General then had 
66Since the introduction of the concept of an “aggravated felony” in 1988 with the passing of 
ADAA, the definition has been vastly expanded.  See Martin, supra note 43, at 63.  IIRIRA, 
passed shortly thereafter AEDPA, expanded the concept of aggravated felony to an even wider 
range of offenses, by lowering certain thresholds that had to be exceeded before several of most 
widely applicable parts of the definition would apply.  For a more in-depth discussion of the 
changes the AEDPA and IIRIRA made to the definition of an aggravated felony see LEGOMSKY, 
supra note 41, at 540-556; see also id.
67
 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2000)).  See also 
Martin, supra note 43, at 63.
68 See Borisov, supra note 54, at 192.
69 See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2000)) 
(“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”).  See also Plight of 
the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1921. 
70 See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(2) (2000)) (an 
alien who “is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”).
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the authority to determine whether the non-citizen should be released into the United States or 
removed.71
3. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
IIRIRA made three significant changes to the prior sections of the INA that pertained to 
the indefinite detention of non-citizens.  First, IIRIRA redefined the long -standing distinctions 
between excludable and deportable non-citizens.72  As discussed above, prior to the passing of 
IIRIRA, non-citizens who were stopped at the port of entry and detained at that point were 
deemed excludable, even if they were eventually granted conditional parole into the United 
States.73  Alternatively, non-citizens who had gained entry into the United States, either legally 
or illegally were considered deportable.74  This distinction was extremely important because 
traditionally courts had ruled that the Constitution afforded greater rights to non-citizens already 
in the United States than to those who had only just arrived at the border.75  IIRIRA, however, 
abolished the significant legal distinction between excludable and deportable non-citizens by 
labeling excludable non-citizens and non-citizens who had illegally entered the country 
71 See id. § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000)). 
72 See Montague, supra note 42, at 1443. 
73 See id.  See also Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
74 See id.
75 See Martin, supra note 43, at 52 (discussing the exclusion-deportation line and its impact on 
non-citizens); see also Chae Chan Ping v. Untied States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that the 
power to exclude foreigners is an incident of sovereignty in turning away a Chinese immigrant at 
the border who had previously lived in the United States); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 
(1892) (excluding a Japanese immigrant whose husband already lived in the United States at the 
point of entry); United States ex. rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (preventing the 
wife of a United States citizen from entering the country without the opportunity for a hearing 
and holding “whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an 
alien denied entry is concerned.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 
(1953) (refusing to allow back into the United States an individual who had previously lived in 
the United States for many years without incident).
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inadmissible.76  These non-citizens, along with non-citizens who had legally entered the United 
States, were now subject to uniform removal proceedings.77  Hence, the bright-line which once 
existed between those stopped at the border and those apprehended within the United States 
became blurred.  Second, IIRIRA expanded the offenses for which non-citizens could be 
removed.78  Any crime that carried more than a one-year prison sentence, irrespective of how 
much time was served, or any crime that involved drugs or a firearm, now resulted in removal.79
Finally, and most significantly for the plight of non-citizens detained on grounds of 
suspected terrorism, IIRIRA eased the detention mandate under AEDPA and restored some 
release discretion to the INS.80  IIRIRA enacted a new section of the INA, § 241(a), that 
comprehensively governed post-order detention, irrespective of the ground of deportability or 
excludability and regardless of the non-citizens criminal record.81  It mandated the detention of 
all removable aliens for a ninety-day “removal period” beginning when the order became final, 
and it directed the INS to ensure their departure within that time.82  It then provided for 
supervised release if removal had not been achieved during that period.83  The law not only 
required the mandatory detention of deportable non-citizens for a period of ninety days while the 
INS made travel arrangements to return, it provided that criminal non-citizens could be detained 
beyond the removal period. (Criminal non-citizens included those removable on terrorist 
76 See Montague, supra note 42, at 1443.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 1444. 
79 See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 237 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2) (2000)); see also 
id.
80 See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000)); see 
also Montague, supra note 42, at 1444.
81 See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000)); see 
also Martin, supra note 43, at 66.
82 See Martin, supra note 43, at 66.
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grounds, as well as those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, drug-
related offenses, firearms offenses, and a catchall category of “miscellaneous crimes,” or those 
non-citizens who were determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or 
unlikely to comply with the order of removal.).84  The federal government allowed exceptions in 
limited circumstances, permitting the release of aliens who were enrolled in witness protection 
programs and who did not pose flight or security risks.85
Therefore, while detention after the ninety-day removal period was not mandated for 
anyone, it was now explicitly permissible for specified categories of non-citizens.  Furthermore, 
now a single unified post-removal order detention regime covered both those non-citizens 
stopped at the border as well resident non-citizens who may have lived their entire lives in the 
United States.  These changes, coupled with the increasingly broad range of crimes for which 
non-citizens could now be deported, significantly expanded the number of non-citizens subject to 
indefinite detention.86 Consequently, challenges to the lengthy and potential indefinite detention 
83 See id; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, § 236 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 
(2000)).
84 See id.  Recent court decisions have invalidated the no-bail provision of the INA as it applies 
to lawful permanent residents. See Hoang v. Comfort, 2002 WL 339348, at *11 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that "the government has failed to show special justifications for the mandatory 
detention provision contained in INA §236(c) which are sufficient to outweigh a lawful 
permanent resident alien's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint 
without an individualized determination of flight risk or danger to the public"); Kim v. Ziglar, 
276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the government has not provided a 'special 
justification' for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a lawful permanent resident alien's 
liberty interest in an individualized determination of flight risk and dangerousness").
85 ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 883.
86 See Martin, supra note 43, at 67 (discussing the broad range of non-citizens subject to 
mandatory detention under IIRIRA).  When enacting IIRIRA, Congress did not provide specific 
guidance as to when the INS should detain inadmissible or criminal non-citizens beyond the 
ninety-day “removal period.”  Therefore, under the guidance of the Attorney General the INS 
introduced implementing regulations which provided that a non-removable non-citizen could be 
released from custody if the non-citizen demonstrated that their release would not pose a danger 
to the community or to the safety of other persons or to property or present a significant risk of 
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of non-citizens under § 241(a) made their way to the courts.  In fact, by 2001 the INA’s post-
order detention provision had led to the indefinite detention of some 3,400 deportable non-
citizens whose home countries refused to accept them.87  Because of both the increasing number 
of suits filed by detained non-citizens and the subsequent split between the federal circuit courts 
across the country regarding the constitutionality of indefinite detention under § 241(a)(6), in 
October 2000, the United States Supreme Court agreed to take up the issue in order to resolve 
questions surrounding the use of indefinite detention.88
The decision of the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis89 altered the landscape of non-citizen 
detention law by raising fundamental questions regarding the scope of Congress’s power to 
authorize the confinement of non-citizens, the latitude available to the executive branch in 
enforcing such legislation, and the level of judicial deference that should be afforded the 
judgment of the political branches on immigration matters, particularly where national security 
interests are at stake.90  Decided less than four months before the terrorist attacks, the Court’s 
ruling and interpretation of  INA § 241(a)(6) in Zadvydas represented the law as it existed in 
regards to the detention of non-citizen suspected terrorists as of September 11, 2001.91
flight.  The regulations allowed the continued detention of any alien unable to meet that burden.  
An initial custody determinations, consisting of a review of the alien’s records and any written 
information submitted on their behalf, was to be conducted prior to the expiration of the ninety-
day removal period in order to determine if such a burden could be met.  Under further 
procedures, if the non-citizen’s deportation was not effectuated and no release was granted by 
the end of the ninety-day period, a subsequent review was mandated “at the expiration of the 
three-month period after the ninety-day review or as soon thereafter as practicable.”  If detention 
was continued, subsequent reviews were to be held at least once a year.  See Borisov, supra note 
54, at 192-93.
87 Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1921.
88 See id. at 1923.
89
 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  
90 See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1915-16.
91
 The decision of the Supreme Court in Zadvydas will be discussed in detail in Part IV of this 
Comment.
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B. The Mandatory Detention of Non-Citizen Terrorists in the United Kingdom prior to 
September 11, 2001
The United Kingdom has been dealing with terrorism and the detention of individuals 
deemed to pose a threat to its nation long before the United States even came into existence.92
While some of their experiences with terrorism resulted from its withdrawal from their colonial 
empire, since 1968 the principal terrorist threat which has shaped the United Kingdom’s 
response to terrorism has been connected with the questions surrounding whether Northern 
Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom or rather it should join the Republic of 
Ireland.93  Thus, this Part will focus primarily on the legislation pertaining to the detention of 
non-citizen suspected terrorists enacted by the United Kingdom from 1968 until September 11, 
2001.  In order to better understand the distinct situation of Northern Ireland which defines the 
United Kingdom’s approach towards terrorism and which has molded its response to terrorism in 
the past, however, it is first necessary to briefly examine both the historical development of the 
problems of Northern Ireland as well as the United Kingdom’s legislative responses to these 
troubles.  This will provide a framework for how and why the United Kingdom has reached its 
current legislative position.
92 See Bonner, supra note 31, at 172.  In addition, while beyond the purview of this Comment, it 
is important to realize that the problems associated with Ireland and Northern Ireland did not 
begin with the partition of the island by the British Government in 1920.  Celtic tribes originally 
settled Ireland and were converted to Catholicism by Saint Patrick around 450 A.D.  Since that 
time, the majority of Irish have followed the Church in Rome.  With the beginning of British 
presence in Ireland in 1169 and finally with King Henry II’s capture of Dublin in 1171, however, 
there has been strife between the Catholics and Protestants in Ireland and more specifically in 
Northern Ireland.  See Clark, supra note 4, at 249-52.  For a complete Irish history and the 
assumption and exercise of extraordinary State power by the British government in Ireland, see 
generally DONAHUE, supra note 6 (discussing counter-terrorism law and emergency powers in 
the United Kingdom from 1922-2000). 
93 See Bonner, supra note 31, at 172-73.
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1. The Division of Ireland and Early British Anti-Terrorism Efforts
In 1920, with the Government of Ireland Act, Britain formally divided Ireland, 
establishing separate, subordinate parliaments in Belfast and Dublin.94  Despite a short civil war 
spurred by the Irish Free State’s opposition to the island’s partition, the Republic of Ireland was 
finally recognized in 1949 with the Republic of Ireland Act.95  Nevertheless, the establishment of 
an independent Ireland did not erase years of resentment and discord.  Many Irish citizens, 
throughout the country, were not satisfied with a freedom that did not encompass all of Ireland.96
Consequently, during the late 1960s, civil unrest steadily increased in Northern Ireland.97  The 
government set up by the British in Northern Ireland, known better as Stormont, reacted with 
hostility, either ignoring or rejecting outright the demands of the protestors.98  While the protests 
for reform were initially non-violent, seeing that its attempts to improve the conditions of the 
minority community in Northern Ireland through political and legal action had largely failed, the 
Irish citizens who were vehemently opposed to the idea of a divided Ireland quickly abandoned 
the tenets of non-violence.99  Soon thereafter, the British military, at Stormont’s request, came to 
Northern Ireland in 1969 to assist in patrolling the streets and essentially replaced the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC)100 as the force primarily responsible for maintaining law and order in 
94
 Clark, supra note 4, at 252.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 252-53; see also DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 117.
98 See Clark, supra note 4, at 253; see also Oren Gross, “Once More unto the Breach”: The 
Systematic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched 
Emergencies, 23 YALE. J. INT’L LAW 437, 475 (1998).
99 See id.
100
 The RUC is the British-backed, Protestant-run police force in Northern Ireland.  See Roger 
Meyers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping 
Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 16 (1990) 
(discussing the role of the RUC in Northern Ireland).
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the territory.101  The situation culminated in 1972 with the infamous “Bloody Sunday” massacre 
which left thirteen unarmed protesters dead at the hands of the British military.102  The chaos 
which followed gave new life to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which had remained quiet 
since the creation of the Free Irish State and resulted in the indefinite suspension of the Stormont 
government by Britain.103  It was at this time that the British began direct rule of Northern 
Ireland.104
In 1973, following the bloodiest year of the “troubles” between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain, the British Parliament enacted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1973 (EPA 1973) which repealed the Special Powers Act which had been in place since the 
partition of Ireland in the 1920s.105  Many of the repealed statute’s provisions were retained in 
the new legislation.106  In addition, EPA 1973 established the Diplock courts, in which the trial 
of persons suspected of certain offenses was to be conducted by one judge, operating under 
relaxed rules of evidence and sitting without a jury.107
Another layer of emergency legislation applying to Northern Ireland was introduced in 
1974 with the enactment of the first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA 





105 See Gross, supra note 98, at 276.  See generally KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE 
CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1975) (discussing the history of British anti-terrorism legislation 
and how its effect on Northern Ireland).
106 See Gross, supra note 98, at 476.
107 See id. See also Bonner, supra note 31, at 183; Clark, supra note 4, at 256; DONAHUE, supra 
note 6, at 123-27.  See generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: 
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108 See Gross, supra note 98, at 476.
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Northern Ireland but instead encompassed all of the United Kingdom.109  PTA 1974 essentially 
replaced the previous legislation, Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, which 
was passed by Parliament in 1939 in an effort to deal with an attempt by the IRA to extend their 
terrorist campaign to the United Kingdom.110  After the passing of the 1939 Act, however, 
because the IRA lacked a sympathetic community from which to operate and because of the 
severe measures imposed by the British government, its activities diminished.111  Therefore, 
similar to the 1939 legislation, PTA 1974 was introduced at a time where there was widespread 
public outrage and demands for greater police action against the IRA.112  The broad regulatory 
power of PTA 1974 included the key anti-terrorism provisions which have consistently marked 
Britain’s response to the unrest in Northern Ireland since the early 1970’s.113
The introduction of PTA 1974 created a dual system of criminal justice in the United 
Kingdom.114  Ordinary decent criminals suspected of the pettiest to the most horrific offenses 
were treated under the ordinary criminal law while those suspected of terrorism were now dealt 
with under PTA 1974.115  The British government originally intended these “emergency powers” 
109 See id; see also Clark, supra note 4, at 253-54.
110 See Gross, supra note 98, at 476; DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 35-36; HILLYARD, supra note 6, 
at 1-2.
111 See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 35-36.
112 See HILLYARD, supra note 6, at 1.
113 See Gross, supra note 98, at 476; see also Bonner, supra note 31, at 179.  Prior to the passing 
of PTA 1974 and EPA 1973 the regulations which governed the detention of suspected terrorists 
were found under the 1922-43 Special Powers Acts (SPA).  Although the government 
immediately announced its intent to repeal the 1922-43 SPA and Regulations and to replace them 
with new emergency legislation, the resultant 1973 EPA and 1974 PTA did not so much revoke 
the revoke the previous statutes as simply rename them and expand them.  Additionally, while 
EPA 1973 sphere of applicability was limited to Northern Ireland, PTA was generally applicable 
throughout the United Kingdom.  See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 130. 
114 See HILLYARD, supra note 6, at 68.
115 See id.
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laws that were only applicable to suspected terrorist to last for the brief period it took to 
reestablish order in Northern Ireland.116  That brief period, however, never expired. 
PTA 1974 was based on two different sources, which, in one way or the other, had been 
introduced to deal with Irish political violence.117  It drew upon and expanded upon a number of 
key elements of EPA 1973, particularly the powers of arrest, detention, and proscription and the 
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, which had been introduced to deal 
with a previous campaign of the IRA.118  PTA 1974 provided the police with extended and 
expansive powers of arrest and detention and gave them new powers to control the movement of 
persons entering and leaving Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  This new legislation swiftly 
became subsumed in British legislation.119  Soon after this new legislation was enacted, the 
burden shifted from those supporting emergency measures to prove that they were imperative, to 
individuals seeking to repeal the legislation needing to demonstrate that an emergency no longer 
existed.120  In other words, the purported temporary nature of the emergency measures seemed to 
be long forgotten as emergency measures slowly became the rule rather than the exception in 
Northern Ireland.  While there were various reviews and minor amendments to both EPA 1973 
and PTA 1974 between 1974 and 2000, these amendments were largely centered on cosmetic 
alterations to the existing statutes, leaving the vast majority of the provisions included in the 
amended versions of EPA and PTA still intact.121  Few new powers were introduced and even 
fewer existing powers were relinquished.  Over this period of time, a blending of EPA and PTA 
116 See Clark, supra note 4, at 254.
117 See HILLYARD, supra note 6, at 2.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 4; see also DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 258.
120 See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 258.
121 See id.
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and a more detailed consideration of permanent counter-terrorist law emerged.122  The gradual 
merger of these provisions ultimately resulted in the passing of Terrorism Act 2000 in March 
2001.  Before discussing Terrorism Act 2000 and the law as it pertained to the United Kingdom 
as of September 11, 2001, however, in an effort to better understand the changes that Terrorism 
Act 2000 made, it is first essential to provide a brief history of the arrest and detention provisions 
as they existed prior to the passing of this piece of legislation.  
2. Anti-Terrorism Law in the United Kingdom from 1973-2000
The “emergency powers” laws initiated with the passing of PTA 1974 and EPA 1973 
granted extremely broad discretion to both the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British 
military in investigations of suspected terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.123  PTA 1974 
authorized law enforcement to arrest anyone without a warrant where it had reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the arrested individual was guilty of some offense under the legislation or if 
the individual was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts 
of terrorism in connection with Northern Ireland affairs or international terrorism.124   Police 
therefore were permitted to stop an individual on the street and question him regarding his 
identity and recent movements.125  The provisions also permitted the RUC or the British military 
to search an individual’s premises and seize any possessions based upon the low threshold 
“reasonable suspicion” of terrorist activity.126  Furthermore, anything found during a warrantless 
122 See id.
123 See Clark, supra note 4, at 254.
124 HILLYARD, supra note 6, at 68.  
125
 Clark, supra note 4, at 254.
126 Id.
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search could be confiscated if the law enforcement believed the item was somehow connected to 
a crime.127
In addition, PTA 1974 authorized the arrest and detention of suspects for questioning 
without trial.128  The RUC was authorized to arrest and detain an individual for an initial period 
of forty-eight hours, which would then be extended to an additional five-day period upon the 
authorization of Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State, all without formal charges or an 
appearance before a magistrate.129  The total length of detention could not, however, exceed 
seven days.130  Because the prime objective of all the PTAs had never been the pursuit of a 
prosecution but instead the pursuit of intelligence gathering in an effort to defeat terrorism, the 
RUC usually ended up releasing a majority of those they detained without ever charging them.131
A review procedure for the detention of suspected terrorists was introduced in an 
amendment to PTA in 1989.  This procedure required an initial review to be carried out as soon 
as practicable after the beginning of the detention and that subsequent reviews would be carried 
out at twelve-hour intervals.132  The reviews, however, could be postponed if it was not 
practicable to carry them out because the person was being questioned or if no review officer 
was readily available.133  The detention could be continued only if it was necessary to obtain or 
preserve evidence specifically related to the offences under the Act or if the individual was 
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 254-55.
130 See HILLYARD, supra note 6, at 76.
131 See id. at 93.  In fact, as of 1993, of 7,052 people who had been detained in connection with 
Northern Ireland affairs under PTA, over 6,097, or eighty-six percent were released without any 
action being taken against them.  These numbers demonstrate how great of an abuse of power 
PTA was in terms of the detention of suspected terrorists.  The arrest and detention powers under 
PTA were instead used by the police essentially to screen the Irish community and seek out 
terrorists.  See id. at 5, 90, 93.
132 See id. at 75.
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thought to be involved in terrorist activities.134  What was so striking about this review procedure 
is that under the amended PTA, a person could be held for up to seven days without any outside 
assessment.135  The detainee only had a right to make representations to the review officer.136
Finally, prior to the 1989 amendment there were no rules governing how long a person 
detained under PTA could be held without being permitted to contact a friend or lawyer.  After 
1989, however, suspected terrorists were permitted to request to have one person informed of 
their detention situation as soon as practicable.137  Nevertheless, this concession was often 
delayed if there were reasonable grounds for believing that alerting someone as to an individual’s 
detention would interfere with the gathering of information about the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism or because it would make it more difficult to prevent an act of 
terrorism or to secure the conviction of someone involved.138
3. Terrorism Act 2000
The purported “temporary” legislation of PTA and EPA was replaced with Terrorism Act 
2000. This piece of legislation reformed and extended the aforementioned counter-terrorist 
legislation, and put it largely on a permanent basis.139  Terrorism Act 2000 came into effect in 
early 2001 and applied to non-citizen terrorist groups as well as domestic terrorist groups and 
was the sole responsibility of the Home Secretary.  Therefore, as discussed earlier in this Part, 
Terrorism Act 2000, unlike other anti-terrorism measures like PTA and EPA did not require 
annual Parliamentary review.    Specifically, the Act (1) prohibited fund-raising and other kinds 
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 76.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 77.
138 See id.
33
of financial support for terrorism, together with power for a court to order forfeiture of any 
money or other property connected with the offenses; (2) provided the police with powers to 
arrest and detain suspected terrorists, and broader powers to stop and search vehicles and 
pedestrians, and to impose parking restrictions; (3) provided examination powers at ports and 
borders; (4) provided for the treatment of suspects who are detained and for judicial extension of 
the initial period of detention; (5) proscribed weapons training for terrorist purposes, including 
recruitment for such training; and (6) proscribed the directing of a terrorist organization, 
possessing articles for terrorist purposes, possessing information for terrorist purposes, and 
incitement of overseas terrorism.140 Terrorism Act 2000 was presciently enacted by the United 
Kingdom in an effort to both expand its power to combat terrorism ahead of the September 11, 
2001 attacks as well as to provide some permanency to the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism 
law. 
In addition, Terrorism Act 2000 repealed previous anti-terrorism measures and adopted a 
wider definition of terrorism, recognizing that terrorism may have religious or ideological as well 
as political motivation, and covered actions which might not be violent in themselves but which 
can, in a modern society, have a devastating impact.141  These could include interfering with the 
supply of water or power where life, health or safety may be put at risk, and the disrupting of key 
computer systems.142
Terrorism Act 2000 was less than a year old when the attacks of September 11, 2001 
occurred.  Therefore, the full effects of the Act’s detention provisions were never fully realized 






and instead have been amended and expanded on by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 as will be examined closely in Part III of this Comment.
III. DETENTION UNDER THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING 
APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 AND THE 
ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 
Just six weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Patriot 
Act—a sweeping anti-terrorism bill which, among other things, broadened the definition of 
“terrorist” and gave law enforcement officials expansive new powers to detain and prosecute 
accused terrorists.143  A number of the Patriot Act’s provisions are uncontroversial and in fact 
were welcomed by the public during a time they felt most vulnerable to international 
terrorism.144  The Act, nevertheless, stands out as radical in the degree in which it sacrifices 
political freedoms in the name of national security and consolidates new powers in the executive 
branch.145  The particular provisions at the center of this Comment, §§ 411 and 412,146 which 
when acting together have been widely criticized as depriving non-citizens of their due process 
and First Amendment rights, mandate the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism.147
Section 411 greatly expands the class of non-citizens who are subject to deportation on grounds 
143 See Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA 
Patriot Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 505 (2002).
144
 For example, other provisions of the Act provide for such things as increased funding for 
counterterrorism activities, particularly for increased border protection, condemnation of 
discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans, preservation of immigration benefits for 
victims, and direct assistance for victims and their families.  See Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001, §§ 101-103, 402, 404, 421-427 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.).  For a complete discussion of federal initiatives in response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks see Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable but Insufficient—Federal Initiatives in Response to the 
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2002).
145 See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 43-4 (2002).
146 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
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of terrorism through its expanded definitions of the terms “terrorist activity,” “engage in terrorist 
activity,” and “terrorist organization.”148  Section 412 substantially enlarges the authority of the 
Attorney General to place non-citizens he suspects are engaged in terrorist activities in detention 
while their deportation proceedings are pending.149
ATCSA is the United Kingdom’s counterpart to the Patriot Act.  Passed in December 
2001 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, ATCSA increases the 
British government’s power to prevent non-citizen suspected terrorists from abusing the 
immigration laws of the United Kingdom.  Like the Patriot Act, ATCSA has been widely 
criticized because it is comprised of unusually coercive powers.150  In contrast to the Patriot Act, 
however, ATCSA was not passed in response to any widely-perceived public emergency in the 
United Kingdom.  The attacks of September 11 were isolated events perpetrated against the 
United States.  There have been no attacks against the United Kingdom and in fact, the attacks of 
September 11 did not deliberately target Britons.151  Furthermore, as will be discussed below, 
ATCSA takes the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism a step further than authorized 
by the Patriot Act.  While most of the Act was accepted without much argument, a small number 
of provisions provoked enormous controversy.  Prior to the enactment of the provisions under 
147 See id. at 62.
148 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, § 411 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.).
149 See id. § 412 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
150 See generally Trevor Aldridge, End of the Affair, SOLICITORS JOURNAL, Jan. 18, 2002 at 31 
(arguing that ATCSA is the antithesis of freedom and civil liberty); Big Brother’s Watching You, 
SOLICITORS JOURNAL, Dec. 21, 2001 at 1174 (arguing that ATCSA will make the United 
Kingdom a less democratic place); Josh Wadham, Out of Proportion, SOLICITOR’S JOURNAL, 
Nov. 23, 2001 at 1074 (discussion the detention provisions of ATCSA and arguing that they are 
disproportional to the situation in the United Kingdom).
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Part 4 of ATCSA the United Kingdom basically had three options for dealing with suspected 
non-citizen terrorists: (1) deport them to a safe third country; (2) prosecute them under existing 
United Kingdom law; or (3) let them go free.152  Section 23 of ATCSA gives the government yet 
another option, potential indefinite detention to prevent the suspected non-citizen terrorist from 
engaging in any future terrorist activities which may be detrimental to the United Kingdom.153
The most controversial provisions of the act, contained in Part 4,154 will be outlined here.  
Part 4, and more specifically, §§ 21-33 of ATCSA, lays out the powers of the Secretary of State 
to certify people as “suspected international terrorists” and “national security risks” and for their 
consequent detention without charge or trial for an unspecified and potentially unlimited period 
of time.
As Part II of this Comment explained, September 11, 2001 did not mark the introduction 
of terrorism to the governments and people of the United States and the United Kingdom.  Each 
country had previously encountered acts of terrorism and had responded to terrorism and terrorist 
threats through various pieces of legislation, albeit differently.  The September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks were different, though.  The precise planning and hatred that characterized the attacks 
and the overall destruction left in their wake was unlike anything either nation had seen before.  
This Part will examine and compare the legislative responses of both nations to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  More specifically, this Part will focus on and outline the specific 
measures of each of these pieces of legislation which allow for the potential indefinite detention 
of non-citizens.  Through this comparison it becomes apparent how restrained the United States’ 
151
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legal response to the terrorist acts of September 11 appears.  Finally, this Part will analyze the 
outlined detention provisions and discuss the potential problems which are almost certain to arise 
in enforcing both of these pieces of legislation. 
A. Expanding the Definition of Terrorism
1. Section 411 of the Patriot Act
Section 411 of the Patriot Act imposes guilt by association on non-citizens by vastly 
expanding the class of non-citizens that can be removed on terrorist grounds.  Before September 
11, the term “terrorist activity” was commonly understood to be limited to premeditated and 
politically-motivated violence targeted against a civilian population. 155  Section 411, however, 
stretches that term to encompass any crime that involves the use of “a weapon or dangerous 
device (other than for mere personal monetary gain).”156  Under this expansive definition, a non-
citizen who grabs a knife or a provisional weapon in any type of heat-of the-moment altercation 
may be deemed removable as a “terrorist.”157
In addition, the term “engage in terrorist activity” has also been expanded to include 
soliciting funds for, soliciting membership for, and providing material support to a “terrorist 
organization” even when that organization has legitimate political and humanitarian ends and the 
non-citizen seeks only to support these lawful ends.158  Before September 11, non-citizens were 
deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist activity, but not for mere association.  Non-
citizens could be deported for providing material support to an organization only if they knew or 
154 Id. §§ 21-36.  For the complete text of Part 4 of ATCSA, see infra pp. 106-118, app. B.
155 See CHANG, supra note 145, at 62.
156
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reasonably should have known that their activity would support the organization “in conducting 
a terrorist activity.”159  Section 411 of the Patriot Act, however, eliminates that nexus 
requirement.  It makes non-citizens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity with a 
“terrorist organization,” whether or not there is any connection between the non-citizen’s 
associational conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism.160
Furthermore, the definition of the term “terrorist organization” has been expanded to 
include groups that have never before been designated as terrorist if they are composed of “two 
or more individuals, whether organized or not,” who engage in specified terrorist activities.161
Therefore, under this law, in a situation in which a non-citizen has solicited funds for, solicited 
membership for, or provided material support to an undesignated “terrorist organization,” § 411 
imposes on him the difficult burden of “demonstrat[ing] that he did not know, and should not 
159
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reasonably have known, that the act would further the organizations terrorist activity.”162  For 
example, if an unsuspecting non-citizen donates money to a charity that is held to be a terrorist 
organization, the seemingly innocent act of giving by the non-citizen may very well serve as a 
ground for removal.163
While the First Amendment implications of § 411 of the Patriot Act are beyond the scope 
of this Comment, it should be noted that by redefining the definitions of terrorist activity and 
terrorist organization, the Patriot Act also resurrects the notion of an ideological exclusion—the 
act of denying entry to non-citizens for pure speech.164  Section 411 bars admission to non-
citizens who “endorse or espouse terrorist activity,” or who “persuade others to support terrorist 
activity a terrorist organization,” in ways determined by the Secretary of State to undermine U.S. 
efforts to combat terrorism.165  It also excludes non-citizens who are representatives of groups 
that “endorse acts of terrorist activity” in ways that similarly undermine U.S. efforts to combat 
terrorism.166  It is well-established that citizens have a constitutional right to endorse terrorist 
organizations or terrorist activity, so long as their speech is not intended and likely to produce 
imminent lawless action.167  While the Supreme Court has ruled that non-citizens that have yet to 
161
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procure entry into the United States have limited constitutional rights,168 these ideological 
exclusions nevertheless raise constitutional concerns.  The First Amendment is designed to 
protect free public debate and in keeping out those persons who voice unpopular beliefs, the 
opportunity of US citizens to hear and consider those ideas may be diminished.169  Excluding 
people for their ideas stands in stark contrast to the spirit of political freedom for which the 
United States stands and for which we are deeply resolved to protecting for in response to the 
September 11 attacks.170
2. Terrorist Status under ATCSA
The core of ATCSA is contained in Part 4 which addresses immigration and asylum.  Part 
4 allows suspected international terrorists to be deported from or imprisoned in the United 
Kingdom.171  The Secretary of State may certify that anyone is a suspected international terrorist 
if he reasonably believes that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national 
security and that the person is a terrorist.172  This is analogous to the power of the Attorney 
General under the Patriot Act to certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.173  In contrast to the limits 
placed on Attorney General’s power under the Patriot Act in regards to the amount of time he 
has to commence proceedings against the detained non-citizen, however, there is no such 
limitation placed on the Secretary of State in Britain.  As discussed above, under § 412 of the 
168 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (stating that a non-citizen outside the 
United States does not have a First Amendment right to contest his exclusion); United States ex 
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (ruling that non-citizens outside the borders of 
the United States do not have a Constitutional right to enter).
169 See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 6, at 970.  
170 See id. at 971.
171 See generally Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, §§ 21-36 (containing those 
provisions which make up Part 4 of ATCSA dealing with immigration and asylum).
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Patriot Act, the Attorney General is required to place a detained non-citizen either in removal 
proceedings or charge him with a criminal offense within seven days after the commencement of 
detention.  If the preceding requirement is not satisfied, the Attorney General must release the 
non-citizen.  Under ATCSA, however, there is no similar limitation placed on the Secretary of 
State to detain an individual. Thus, prior to even certification, a non-citizen could potentially be 
detained for an indefinite amount of time.
Under ATCSA, the all-important word “terrorist” is defined as a person who (a) is or has 
been concerned in the commission, preparation, or instigation or acts of international terrorism; 
(b) is a member or belongs to an international terrorist group; or (c) has links with an 
international terrorist group provides for the power of certification of a person as a suspected 
international terrorist.174  The last of these criteria is potentially extremely broad and vague and 
the government came under pressure from Parliament to clarify the phrase “links with.”175  In 
response, the government narrowed the scope of the phrase by offering the following definition: 
“a person has links with an international terrorist group only if he supports or assists it.”176
Thus, the expanded definition of a terrorist under ATCSA is comparable to that under the Patriot 
Act which now makes non-citizens deportable as terrorist for wholly innocent associational 
activity with a “terrorist organization,” regardless if there is any connection between the non-
citizen’s associational conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism.177
The term “terrorism” in this section of Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 has 
the same meaning as in Terrorism Act 2000, § 1.  This definition is broad and includes: 
174 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 21; see also Tomkins, supra note 7, at 
211. 
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the use or threat of action … designed to influence the government or to intimidate the 
public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause…which 
involves serious violence against a person or serious damage to property, endangers a 
person’s life, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or is designed 
seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”178
By seeking to merely influence the government, rather than seeking to intimidate or 
coerce the government, and by expanding the definition of terrorism to encompass the most 
serious violence, the distinction between terrorism and other criminal activity governed by 
regular public order law instead of special provisions of terrorism law, has become blurred.179
Thus, the potential reach of this provision of Part 4 concerning suspected non-citizen terrorists is 
considerable.  This is important because although granting extraordinary powers to the state 
during times of emergency may be justified, the availability of these powers must be limited to 
situations where it is absolutely necessary and even then only in carefully defined and specified 
circumstances.180  The problem is that the United Kingdom has not satisfied these criteria in 
passing the ATCSA.  
Compared to the Patriot Act, the definition of terrorism under ATCSA appears to be as 
expansive but noticeably less vague.  Under the Patriot Act, the term “terrorist activity” has been 
stretched to include any crime that involves the use of “a weapon or dangerous device (other than 
for mere personal monetary gain).”181  Thus, while the definition under both pieces of legislation 
increases the types of activity which will be considered terrorist acts, the definition under 
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ATCSA more clearly articulates exactly what type acts will fall under the Act’s definition.  Each 
definition, however, is open to similar types of abuse.
B. Detention of Certified Individuals
1. Section 412 of the Patriot Act
At the same time that § 411 expands the class of non-citizens who are deportable on 
grounds of terrorism, § 412 inflates the Attorney General’s power to detain non-citizens who are 
suspected of terrorism and radically revises the rules governing detention of non-citizens. 182
Prior to September 11, 2001, non-citizens in removal proceedings were subject to preventative 
detention under essentially the same standards that apply to defendants in criminal proceedings: 
They could be detained without bond if they posed a danger to the community or a risk of 
flight.183  If the government could not make such a showing in a hearing before an immigration 
judge, non-citizens were entitled to release on bond.184
Conversely, § 412 of the Patriot Act authorizes the Attorney General to detain non-
citizens without a hearing and without a showing that they pose a threat to national security or a 
flight risk.185  He need only certify that he “has reasonable grounds to believe” that a non-citizen 
is engaged in terrorist activity or in any other activity endangering the national security of the 
United States, and the non-citizen is then subject to potentially indefinite mandatory detention.186
182 See CHANG, supra note 145, at 64; Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 6, at 971.
183




 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, § 412(a)(3) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).  In 
addition, because the definition of “engage in terrorist activity” have been defined so broadly as 
to include the use of, or threat to use, a weapon with intent to endanger person or property, it 
would encompass a non-citizen who used a kitchen knife in a domestic abuse with her abusive 
husband, or a non-citizen who found themselves in a bar fight, picked up a bottle, and threatened 
another person with it.  Clearly, not all such persons pose a danger or flight risk necessitating 
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Following certification by the Attorney General, a non-citizen suspected of terrorist 
activity must be taken into custody and may be held without charge of a criminal or immigration 
violation for up to seven days.187  To continue detention beyond seven days, the government 
must begin deportation proceedings or bring criminal charges against the non-citizen.188  If the 
government fails to do so, the non-citizen must be released.189  For a non-citizen against whom 
the government initiates deportation proceedings, detention must continue, even if the non-
citizen is granted relief from removal, until the Attorney General decertifies him.190  If the 
certified non-citizen is deemed removable and his removal is unlikely in the “reasonably 
foreseeable future,” he may be detained for an additional period of up to six months if his release 
would “threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any 
person.”191  If the non-citizen is ultimately determined not to be removable, however, he must be 
released.192
mandatory preventative detention, nevertheless the Patriot Act empowers the Attorney General 
to detain such persons without even proving that they pose a danger or flight risk.  See Patriot 
Act, supra note 5, at § 411(a).  See also Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 6, at 971.
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190 Id. § 412(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
191 Id. § 412(a)(6) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).  This section has been extremely 
controversial because while the Patriot Act appears to state that the longest possible detention is 
six months, the explicit language only requires the Attorney General to review the certification 
every six months.  Thus, the language of the statute seems to permit a non-citizen to be subject to 
indefinite detention provided that the Attorney General reviews his certification every six months 
and determines that the certification should not be revoked.  Thus, while there is a cap of seven 
days on the initial detention period under § 412(a)(5), once detained for a removal proceeding of 
criminal charge, this period is ultimately redefined to the extent that the non-citizen cannot be 
removed and continues to be certified based upon on reasonable grounds to believe that the non-
citizen poses a risk to national security.  See id. § 412(a)(6), (7) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1226a).
192 Id. § 412(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
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Section 412 also requires the Attorney General to review the detention of non-citizens 
certified under the Act every six months and to report to Congress on the number of aliens 
certified, their nationality, the grounds for certification, and the duration of detention.193  In 
addition, certified individuals who are detained under the Patriot Act do have access to judicial 
review.194  Detainees are allowed to initiate habeas corpus proceedings in any district court 
otherwise having jurisdiction.195  Appeals from unfavorable decisions, however, are limited and 
more difficult to obtain than prior to September 11, 2001.  Appeals may be made only to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the law which must be applied in such cases is 
limited to the law applied by that court or the United States Supreme Court.196
2. Detention under ATCSA
The most significant power which the state now has under Part 4 of Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 pertaining to suspected international terrorists is the authority of 
the Secretary of State to detain a certified suspected non-citizen terrorist indefinitely without 
trial.197  This is easily distinguishable from the Patriot Act which explicitly provides for 
proceedings, either removal or criminal, to be commenced against the non-citizen within seven 
days of their apprehension as well as provides for judicial review of any decision to certify an 
individual as a terrorist.  Conversely, under § 23 of ATCSA a suspected non-citizen terrorist may 
be detained indefinitely if his removal from the United Kingdom is prevented either by a point of 
law or by a practical consideration.198  This last point deserves some further explanation.
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There are two primary reasons why the deportation or removal of a non-British national 
from the United Kingdom may prove difficult.  First, removal or deportation from the United 
Kingdom could be prevented by, for example, the fact that the individual concerned may be a 
stateless person or because the United Kingdom authorities are unable to find another country 
willing to accept him or her.199  The very fact that the individual has been certified by the 
Secretary of State as a suspected terrorist may make finding another country an extremely 
frustrating task.200
Second, the United Kingdom government may also be prevented from effecting a 
removal or deportation of anyone certified as a suspected terrorist as a result of the United 
Kingdom’s obligations under Article 3 of European Commission on Human Rights.201  In Chalal 
v. United Kingdom,202 the European Court ruled that the British government’s attempt to deport 
an individual who had been detained pending deportation to India on “national security” grounds 
was in violation of ECHR.203  Chahal was an Indian Sikh who had entered the United Kingdom 
illegally and was detained pending deportation, but feared return to India because of his previous 
Sikh separatist activities.  The Court, in interpreting the ECHR, found that Article 3 protected 
one of the most fundamental values of democratic society in that it prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct 
and that Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible.204
199 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S MEMORANDUM TO THE UK 
GOVERNMENT ON PART 4 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001, Sept. 5, 
2002, available at www.amnesty.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
200 See id.
201 See id.  Article 3 of ECHR states “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 3.
202
 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1997).
203 See id. at 446.
204 See id. at 414.
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Adhering to this interpretation, the Court held that the prohibition of torture contained in Article 
3 of ECHR was absolute and that allegations of national security risk were immaterial to a 
determination of whether a person faced a “real risk” of torture if returned.205
Another extremely important aspect of § 23 of ATCSA is the United Kingdom’s 
derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), so as to 
ensure that the provisions contained in Part 4 of the new legislation do not violate the United 
Kingdom’s obligations under Article 5 of the Convention.206  While Article 5(1)(f) of ECHR 
permits the lawful “detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the 
country or of a person against who action is being taken with a view to deportation,”207 because 
the government intends to detain even those individuals who are not subject to removal 
proceedings,208 this Article will not save all detentions which the government proposes under this 
provision.209  Therefore, to enable Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to be passed, the 
British government was forced to formally derogate under Article 15 of ECHR from Article 5(1) 
205 See id.  at 446.
206 See Khan, supra note 7, at 11.  Article 5 of ECHR provides that “Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person.”  ECHR, supra note 14, art. 5.  This provision has consistently 
been ruled by the European Court to reinforce the fundamental duty of member states to respect 
the right of all human being to their physical security.  See MARK JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 309 (2000).
207
 ECHR, supra note 14, art. 5(1)(f).
208
 The reason why the government would choose to detain someone instead of deporting them is 
the result of Britain’s obligations under Article 3 of ECHR.  The European Court has 
consistently held that it is a violation of Article 3 for a state to deport a person where “substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real 
risk of being subjected to treatment in contrary to Article 3 in the receiving county.”  Unlike 
Article 5, Article 3 is one of the few provisions of ECHR which is absolute and which states 
cannot derogate from.  See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 212-13.
209 Id. at 212.  As the European Court held in Chahal, “any depravation of liberty under Article 
5(1)(f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress.  If such 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible.” 
See Chahal, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. at  417.
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of ECHR which relates to the detention of a person where there is an intention to remove or 
deport him from the United Kingdom.210
What also clearly distinguishes ATCSA from the Patriot Act is that ATCSA excludes 
regular judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decisions and actions under both § 21 
(certification of a person as a suspected terrorist) and § 23 (indefinite detention without trial of a 
suspected terrorist).211  As previously discussed, under § 412 of the Patriot Act a non-citizen 
detained as a certified terrorist has the ability to obtain judicial review of his detention.  This 
review is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings and applies to any non-citizen 
subject to detention under the Patriot Act.  Conversely, ATCSA provides that such decisions and 
actions may only be questioned in legal proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC).212
SIAC was established by Parliament in 1997 to entertain certain appeals against 
immigration and deportation decisions which have been taken on national security grounds.213
210
 Khan, supra note 7, at 11.  Article 15(1) of ECHR provides that “in time of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation, any High Contracting Party may take 
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation….”.  See id.  The British government has not claimed that this is a 
“time of war” and thus, the basis of its derogation is on that this is a time of “public emergency.” 
The question which therefore must be contemplated is whether the various requirements of 
Article 15(1) are met here.  More specifically, is there currently a public emergency which 
threatened the life of the United Kingdom and if so, are the measures contained in ATCSA 
strictly required by the exigencies of this emergency?  See id.  These questions and the validity 
of the United Kingdom’s derogation will be discussed in more depth in Part IV of this Comment.
211 Id. at 217.
212 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, §§ 21, 25.
213 See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 217.  Special Immigration Appeals Commission was 
established in order to bring United Kingdom law into conformity with Article 5(4) of ECHR
following the decision of the European Court in Chahal.  See Chahal, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 448-49.  
Before, the sorts of decisions which now come before SIAC could be reviewed only by an 
advisory panel in respect of which applicants were not entitled to legal representation and were 
given only an outline of the grounds for the Secretary of State’s decision.  Furthermore, the 
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SIAC enjoys the status of that of a superior court of record—one of the effects of which is that it 
is not subject to additional judicial review.214  In a proceeding before SIAC, the appellant has his 
legal representatives chosen for them by the government and this person is not responsible to the 
appellant.215  Furthermore, proceedings before SIAC may be held in the absence of the appellant 
and/or his lawyer and proceedings may occur without the appellant being fully aware of the 
reasons for the decisions which have been made in respect of him.216  Therefore, unlike § 412 of 
the Patriot Act, there are no explicit provisions under ATCSA providing those arrested and 
detained under the Act with the right to bring proceedings to have a court determine quickly the 
lawfulness of the detention, and order release if the detention is deemed unlawful.  The 
fundamental safeguard of habeas corpus present in the Patriot Act therefore does not protect non-
citizens suspected of terrorism against arbitrary detention under ATCSA.
Operating within the procedural constraints of SIAC, limited review of §§ 21-23 is, 
however, available under ATCSA.217  Nevertheless, as discussed above, unlike the Patriot Act, 
there is no explicit provision of ATCSA which requires the Secretary of State to commence 
proceedings within a certain period of time.  A non-citizen could therefore be held for a 
considerable amount of time without being charged with any type of immigration violation or 
criminal activity.  Thus, while SIAC is permitted to hear appeals against certification decisions 
under § 21,218 a non-citizen could be held for a long period before even being certified.  The 
rules governing appeals to SIAC require that all appeals be brought within three months of the 
panel’s recommendations were neither binding on the Secretary of State nor disclosed to the 
applicant.  See Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.
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certification and SIAC is required to cancel a certification if it considers that there are no 
reasonable grounds for suspecting the person to be a terrorist.219  With no limit on how long a 
non-citizen can be held without being certified as a terrorist, however, an individual could be 
detained arbitrarily without a chance for judicial review for a period longer than three months.  
SIAC is also required to conduct a review of every certificate issued under § 21 once the 
suspected terrorist has been in detention for six months.220  Cancellation of a certification by 
SIAC, however, “shall not prevent the Secretary of State from issuing another certificate.”221
Thus, SIAC appears to have little authority to overrule a decision of the Secretary of State to 
certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.
Despite the overall extraordinary power of detention without trial which is placed into the 
hands of the state, there are two safeguards contained within Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 which purport to protect against arbitrary detention by the government.  First, § 28 
requires there to be a review by a person to be appointed by the Secretary of State of the 
operation of §§ 21-23.222  This review must be conducted within fourteen months of the Act’s 
coming into force.223  This review is somewhat similar to the requirement under § 412 of the 
Patriot Act which requires the Attorney General to submit reports to various government 
committees on the number of non-citizens who are being affected by the Act’s detention 
provisions.  Second, § 29 requires that §§ 21-23 will expire within fifteen months after the Act’s 
219 Id.
220 Id. § 26.  Additionally, identical to the appeals procedure under § 25, if on a review under § 
26 SIAC determines that there are no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person 
concerned is a terrorist within the meaning of the Act, SIAC must cancel the certification.
221 Id. § 27.
222 Id. § 28.
223 Id.
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coming into force, although the Secretary of State retains the power to revive them.224
Furthermore, § 29(7) provides that §§ 21-23 will cease to have effect altogether five years after 
the Act’s coming into force and in order to revive these provisions a further Act of Parliament 
would be required.225
C. Criticism of the Patriot Act and ATCSA’s Detention Measures
1. Patriot Act
While Congress’s incorporation of judicial review and time limitations into the detention 
provisions of the Patriot Act purport to eliminate the potential for indefinite mandatory detention, 
it has been alleged that these safeguards may not go far enough.226  Even with the limits placed 
on the executive branch’s authority to implement immigration policy, the detention provisions 
contained in the Patriot Act undoubtedly raise serious constitutional concerns.
First, and most notably, the detention provisions have been argued to violate a non-
citizen’s due process rights.227  By giving the Attorney General the authority to detain a non-
citizen based upon a reasonable suspicion of “terrorist activity” broadly conceived, the language 
of the statute appears impermissibly vague.228  Though decided before the Patriot Act was 
224 Id. § 29.
225 Id.
226
 For example, as discussed supra note 170, while §§ 412(a)(6) and (7) seem to purport that the 
longest possible detention authorized under the Patriot Act is six months, upon a careful 
examination of the language of the statute it becomes apparent that the Attorney General is only 
required to review the certification every six months.  The statute says nothing regarding the 
length of time a certified non-citizen can ultimately be detained.  Thus, while under § 412(a)(5) 
detention is initially limited to seven days, once an individual is detained for a removal 
proceeding or criminal charges, the period for which the non-citizen could be detained is 
undefined to the extent that the non-citizen is unable to be removed and continues to be certified 
by the Attorney General based upon reasonable grounds that the non-citizen is a threat to 
national security.  See Whitney D. Frazier, The Constitutionality of Detainment in the Wake of 
September 11th, 90 KY. L.J. 1089, 1112-13 (2001-02). 
227 See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1934.
228 See id.
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enacted, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Morales,229  best 
illustrates this recognized concept of impermissible vagueness and sets forth the analysis the 
Supreme Court would likely employ when interpreting a statute such as the Patriot Act.  In City 
of Chicago the Court held Chicago’s gang loitering ordinance unconstitutional because it defined 
the offense so vaguely as to provide “absolute discretion to police officers to decide what 
activities constitute loitering.”230  The Court recognized that “preservation of liberty depends in 
part on the maintenance of social order,”231 but ruled that the law violated due process because it 
failed to “provide the kind of notice that would enable people to understand what conduct it 
prohibits.”232
Applying the analysis of the Supreme Court in City of Chicago, it is possible that the 
expansion of the term “terrorist activity” to include the use of “firearm, or other weapon or 
dangerous device” under the Patriot Act may be impermissibly vague.233  For instance, this 
definition seems to be applicable to any situation from the use of a chemical bomb in a busy New 
York City subway station to a bar room fight where one individual threatens another with a 
broken beer bottle.  Furthermore, the statute’s vague description of “terrorist organizations” 
leaves non-citizens constantly pondering whether they are participating in or donating to groups 
that engage in “terrorist activity” which would in turn lead to their certification as a terrorist.234
For example, a non-citizen’s good faith donation to a charitable association or a mere innocent 
association with a particular organization may consequently result in their deportation.   This is 
because the Patriot Act includes as “terrorist organizations” any group with “two or more 
229
 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
230 Id. at 61.
231 Id. at 64.
232 Id. at 56.
233 See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1935.
53
individuals, whether organized or not,” provided the group engages in specified activities.235   To 
more adequately protect the due process rights of non-citizens, a more precise definition may be 
necessary to define exactly what conduct will result in detention under the statute.236
Yet another possible due process concern raised by the Patriot Act is that it allows the 
indefinite detention of non-citizens who have been granted relief from removal and of non-
citizens for who repatriation is not reasonably foreseeable (provided their release would 
“threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any 
person”).237  In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that indefinite civil detention violates 
due process unless it is ordered in “non-punitive circumstances” in which a “special 
justification” exists.238  The Zadvydas Court did however recognize in dictum that suspected 
terrorists could be held for indefinite periods in preventative detention.239  The Court appeared to 
understand that removable non-citizens detained for “terrorism or other special circumstances 
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention” should not be 
affected by the general rule disapproving the indefinite detention of non-citizens not likely to be 
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.240   Thus, as will be further argued in Part IV of 
this Comment, Zadvydas seemingly exempted suspected terrorists as a “small segment of 
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One could also attack the Patriot Act on procedural due process grounds.242  The statute 
does not require an objective showing that the individual poses a danger to the community and 
instead relies on the Attorney General’s determination that he has “reasonable grounds” to 
believe that a non-citizen is engaged in terrorist activity and therefore subject to certification.243
In addition to the above due process attacks which arguably could be made against the 
Patriot Act’s detention provisions, the Act has been criticized on other grounds as well.  First, it 
has been argued that the detention provisions of the Patriot Act provide the certified terrorist 
with limited options for relief.  The statute prohibits administrative appeal of the Attorney 
General’s decision to certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.244  Detainees are therefore left with one 
avenue for relief—the filing a habeas petition in federal court.245  This purported safeguard has 
been criticized, however, on the grounds that the statue does not establish a standard of review 
that will apply to the Attorney General’s certification and the decision to certify the alien in the 
first place may rest on secret evidence that cannot be reviewed by the detainee.246  Nevertheless, 
as well be discussed below, this avenue of relief available, irrespective of the limits placed upon 
242
 The limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause are of two distinct types—procedural and 
substantive.  Procedural due process commands that when the government acts to deprive a 
person of life, liberty, or property, it must do so in accord with procedures that are deemed fair.  
Procedural due process usually requires that a person be given notice and opportunity to be heard 
before a depravation of rights occurs.  Substantive due process insists that the law itself be fair 
and reasonable and have an adequate justification regardless of how fair or elaborate the 
procedures may be for implementing it.  See generally ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 2001 (discussing the provisions of the United States 
Constitution that protect individuals against the government).
243
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13 (Federalist Society White Paper, Nov. 2001); Anite Ramasastry, Indefinite Detention Based 
upon Suspicion: How the Patriot Act Will Disrupt Many Lawful Immigrants’ Lives, Findlaw’s 
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it, is substantially greater than the relief available to those non-citizens detained in the United 
Kingdom under Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
Finally, as briefly touched upon in Part III.A.1 of this Comment, the Patriot Act may 
infringe on a non-citizen’s freedom of expression.  By expanding the definition of the term 
“terrorist activity” to include the donation to or solicitation of funds for a “terrorist 
organization,” the provisions allow for potentially indefinite detention of non-citizens based 
solely on political associations which seemingly are under the purview of the First Amendment.  
In Brandenburg v. Ohio247, the Supreme Court held that the “constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action.”248  Furthermore, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co.249, the Court went even further and ruled that “mere advocacy of the use of force or violence 
does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment.”250  Nevertheless, the 
holdings of the Court in these two cases are not likely to have an impact when attacking the 
constitutionality of the detention provisions of the Patriot Act.  The reason is that the detention 
provisions of the Patriot Act pertain to non-citizens.  Although permanent resident non-citizens 
do enjoy First Amendment rights,251 under certain circumstances it is well-established that they 
Legal Comment. (Oct. 5, 2001), available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011005_ramasastry.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
247
 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
248 Id. at 447.
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 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
250 Id. at 927.
251 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 
(1945). 
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may enjoy less constitutional protection than citizens.252 A strong argument can be made that 
any association with a terrorist organization like al-Qaida is both directed at inciting imminent 
lawless action and is very likely to incite or produce exactly this type of action.  
In sum, the implications of §§ 411 and 412 of the Patriot Act for non-citizens are 
certainly far-reaching, but as will be argued in infra Part III.B of this Comment, not as sweeping 
as the detention provisions found under ATCSA.  Non-citizens who engage in political activities 
in connection with any organization risk being certified as terrorists and subject to potentially 
indefinite detention whether on a technical immigration violation or on terrorism grounds.253  In 
addition, non-citizens are unable to protect themselves from these risks by avoiding association 
with organizations that have been designated as “terrorist organizations” because the Act 
expands that term to include undesignated and undefined grounds.254   Non-citizens cannot even 
protect themselves by limiting their activity to seemingly innocent behavior such as soliciting 
membership for, soliciting funds for, and providing material support to a newly designated 
“terrorist organization” with only the goal of promoting the organization’s lawful ends because 
the Act broadens the term “engage in terrorist activity” to include exactly these types of 
activities.255  Therefore, in the post-Patriot Act world, non-citizens who are intent on avoiding 
the risks of being certified as a suspected terrorist and the possibility of indefinite detention 
should refrain from any associations with organizations that could potentially be deemed 
252 See Harvard Law Review Association, “Foreign” Campaign Contributions and the First 
Amendment, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1886, 1895 (1997).  For a general analysis of the constitutional 
rights of non-citizens see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3-15 (1996); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and 
the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1048-59 (1994).
253 See Nancy Chang, The USA PATRIOT Act: What’s So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill 




terrorist, even if they are partaking in seemingly innocent activities.256  While the full effect of 
the detention provisions of the Patriot Act have yet to be recognized, our commitment to the Bill 
of Rights and to the democratic values that define the United States have undoubtedly been put 
to the test by the events of September 11, 2001.  Exactly how far the government can proceed in 
sacrificing civil liberties in hopes of gaining an added measure of security will certainly be tested 
in the upcoming months throughout the federal court system.  As will be discussed below and in 
detail in Part IV of this Comment, however, regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately 
rules and despite the Patriot Act’s infringement on the civil liberties of non-citizens, the 
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, when compared with those of the United Kingdom’s 
ATCSA, reflect a reasoned balance between both liberty and security. 
2. ATCSA
Like the Patriot Act, the detention provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 have been extensively attacked as being both unlawful and disproportionate in light of 
the state of affairs in the United Kingdom since September 11, 2001.  Before outlining these 
criticisms in detail, however, it would be helpful to first provide a brief introduction to ECHR in 
order to better understand the obligations the United Kingdom is required to fulfill as a member.  
Only then can a more comprehensive analysis of whether the detention measures of ATCSA are 
justifiable be undertaken.  
Adopted in 1950, ECHR obligates its member countries to “secure the rights and 
freedoms” of the Convention to everyone in their jurisdiction.257  Broadly speaking, ECHR 
provides international protection for a variety of civil and political rights much like those 
255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 1
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contained in the United States Bill of Rights.258  The fundamental goal of ECHR is to promote 
individuals rights and freedoms in an effort to best protect democracy.259
ECHR is comprised of various provisions.  Of particular importance to the focus of this 
Comment is Article 5, which addresses the detention of non-citizens.  It protects against 
unwarranted state intrusions upon the liberty and security of individuals by prohibiting 
unjustified detentions.260  Although the member countries consider the rights and freedoms 
detailed in ECHR to be fundamental to democracy, however, ECHR nevertheless contains a 
public emergency exception.  Article 15(1) of ECHR provides that “in times of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measure 
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation ….”261  In reviewing a member country’s declaration of a public 
emergency under Article 15, the European Court has consistently maintained that it plays a 
limited role in the review of a member country’s derogation under Article 15.262  The Court 
instead grants member countries a margin of appreciation recognizing that each member state is 
primarily responsible for its own survival and stability.263  Because individual governments have 
continuous and direct contact with the everyday conditions of the state and therefore are in the 
best position to make such a determination, the Court requires each member country to 
258 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 11.
259 See Henning, supra note 7, at 1270.
260 See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 5.
261 Id. art. 15.
262
 See, e.g., Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539 (1994) (affording a broad conception of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine in finding the derogation of the United Kingdom under Article 15 of 
ECHR to be lawful).  For an explanation of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see Gross, supra
note 98, at 495-99.  
263 See Henning, supra note 7, at 1274.
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determine the severity of the threat to the nation and allows the country to determine the scope of 
the measures which are necessary to monitor the situation.264
In Lawless v. Ireland,265 the Court entertained a challenge by an Irish individual who at 
one time was a member of the IRA and then, according to his own account, left that organization 
fewer than five months later.266  Nevertheless, he was detained without trial for a period of 
almost six months.267  The European Court held that detaining Lawless violated his right to 
liberty Article 5 of ECHR.268  Therefore, it was essential to examine if the detention could be 
justified under the provisions of Article 15.
In Lawless, the Commission defined, and the Court agreed, that a public emergency for 
the purposes of Article 15 of ECHR is a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or crisis 
affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and constituting a threat to the 
organized life of the community which composes the State in question.269  This definition was 
further developed by the Commission, which in the 1969 case of Denmark, Norway, Sweden & 
the Netherlands v. Greece270( the “Greek Case”) held that in order to satisfy Article 15, a public 
emergency had to be “actual or imminent,” its effects had to “involve the whole nation,” the 
continuance of the organized life of the community must be threatened,” and the crisis or danger 
must be “exceptional,” in that normal measures were “plainly inadequate.”271
264 See id.
265
 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 (1979-80).  For an in-depth analysis of the Court’s ruling in Lawless see 
generally BRIAN DOOLAN, LAWLESS V. IRELAND (1957-1961): THE FIRST CASE BEFORE THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE? (2001).
266 Lawless, 1Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 37.
269 See id. at 30.
270
 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 1.
271
 1 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GREEK CASE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(1969).
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Applying the rules of Lawless and the Greek case to the present state of affairs, it is 
difficult to conclude that the current climate in the United Kingdom amounts to the type of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.  First, it is important to note that despite 
the supposed present international “war on terrorism,” the United Kingdom is the only one of the 
forty-one member states to have ratified the Convention which has found it necessary to derogate 
from the terms of ECHR over this matter.272  It is thus somewhat doubtful that the current state 
of affairs in the United Kingdom could constitute a public emergency within the meaning of 
ECHR.273  The attacks on the United States have ended and there has yet to be an attack on the 
United Kingdom.  Therefore, while it may be accurate to say there is a concern and that the 
United Kingdom should remain alert, it is questionable if there is a public emergency in the 
United Kingdom at this time.274
Furthermore, even if it was determined that a public emergency does presently exist in 
the United Kingdom, it is even more difficult to conclude that the detention measures contained 
in Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 are absolutely necessary.  It appears that the 
measures implemented in relation to the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism are not 
commensurate with the current situation in the United Kingdom.275  The current situation appears 
distinguishable from Northern Ireland’s position in Brannigan & McBride  v. United Kingdom,
where the Court held that the United Kingdom’s derogation from Article 5 was in fact 
justified.276  Whereas between 1972 and 1992 there were some 3,000 deaths and over 40,000 
terrorist incidents attributed to terrorism in Northern Ireland, there have been no terrorist 
272 See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 205-06.
273
 Black-Branch, supra note 151, at 26. 
274 See id.
275 See id.
276See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 215.
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incidents in the United Kingdom directly associated with what happened in the United States on 
September 11, 2001.277 In fact, in January 2002, shortly after the passing of ATCSA, the Home 
Secretary confirmed in Parliament that there was “no immediate intelligence pointing to a 
specific threat to the United Kingdom.”278
In addition, even if the government was to prevail on the public emergency argument, it 
would have to prove to the satisfaction of the Court, that the continuing operational effectiveness 
of the al-Qaida network poses an immediate and specific threat to the United Kingdom which is 
nonetheless serious enough so that the nation should regard itself as being in a state of 
emergency.279  Even if this argument were to succeed, it is probable that the breadth of the 
coercive powers contained in Part 4 of ATCSA would make it difficult to establish that the 
detention measures contained in the Act are strictly necessary.280  The detention provisions are 
not limited only to those persons who pose a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom as a result of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Instead, the Act covers all non-citizens suspected of terrorism, 
not just those responsible for the attacks in the United States.281  Thus, the expansive nature of 
the detention measures contained in Part 4 of ATCSA will make it difficult to show that the 
provisions contained in the Act are strictly necessary to respond to the attacks of September 11, 
2001.
277 See id. at 216.  Despite the absence of terrorist attacks in connection with the attacks in the 
United States on September 11, 2001 in the United Kingdom, the British government has 
continually insisted that there is a high probability that sooner or later international terrorist will 
launch an attack against the United Kingdom.  See, e.g., “High” Chance of UK Terror Attack, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/12/18/terror.alert/index.html (Dec. 18, 
2002) (discussing a government briefing in London which warned of the possibility of future 
terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom) (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
278
 Khan, supra note 7, at 11.
279 See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 216.
280 See id.
281 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 21.
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In short, ATCSA is a momentous piece of legislation that conferred great power, 
arguably, too much power, to the state, especially in the areas of deportation and detention 
without trial.  Undoubtedly, the power to indefinitely detain will adversely affect non-citizen 
nationals suspected by the Secretary of State of involvement in terrorism but who cannot be 
deported.  Furthermore, it is probable that innocent people are likely to be rounded up as well in 
the search for suspected non-citizen terrorists.282  Whether these new laws are justified and 
proportionate in light of the current situation in the United Kingdom as well as how these laws 
should be used have been popular matters of debate and causes of concern since the laws’ 
passing.283  At this point, it is still too early to attempt to assess the legal and political impact of 
ATCSA as it remains to be seen what kind of use will be made of the detention powers outlined 
in the above discussion. While many of ATCSA’s provisions are seemingly identical to those 
found under the Patriot Act, however, the detention provisions under the Act are considerably 
more suspect than those of its American counterpart.  As this Comment will argue in Part IV, the 
way in which the United Kingdom responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 poses 
an unjustifiable threat to the freedom and civil liberty of non-British nationals in the United 
Kingdom and proceeds too far in the name of national security.
282 See Wadham, supra note 150, at 1074.
283
 In July of 2002 SIAC found that the targeting of non-citizens of the United Kingdom certified 
by the Secretary of State to be suspected terrorists under Part 4 of ATCSA was discriminatory 
and that the detention measures were not compatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations 
under ECHR.  See Amnesty International News Release, Detaining Non-UK Nationals 
Indefinitely is Discriminatory, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/uk07302002.html (July 30, 2002) (last visited October 5, 
2002); BBC News, Terror Suspects Win Appeal, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2161710.stm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).  As of the writing of this 
Comment, the United Kingdom is appealing the judgment and the detainees detained under the 
detention provisions of ATCSA had yet to be released.
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IV. THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001: REASONED 
RESPONSES OR OVERREACTIONS?
A. USA Patriot Act
1. Will the Supreme Court Uphold a Challenge to the Patriot Act’s Detention Provisions?
Unquestionably, the U.S. government has a compelling interest in responding to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Whether these interests justify broad restrictions such as 
the indefinite detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism has yet to be determined, however.  
Surely restrictions such as this raise serious constitutional concerns.  Nevertheless, as will be
discussed below, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the executive’s extraordinary 
powers to protect national security and it is unlikely that the current “war” on terror will be an 
exception.  Thus, it is not only possible, but probable that the detention provisions of the Patriot 
Act would pass constitutional muster.  Furthermore, this Comment will argue that the Patriot 
Act’s detention provisions, while possibly hostile to the traditional civil liberties of non-citizens 
in the United States, are more justifiable than the detention provisions enacted by the United 
Kingdom under ATCSA.  In addition, not only are the detention measures under the Patriot Act 
reasoned responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, but they may be necessary responses 
in this uncertain time.  While history tells us that in our fight for freedom we may inevitably 
impinge upon certain civil liberties, history also reassures us that these emergency measures have 
had no lasting effect on American society once our battles have been won and peace has been  
restored.284  In fact, the Patriot Act, with its explicit safeguards, may illustrate how previous 
284 See Ting, supra note 144, at 1147 (for example, both Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus 
during the Civil War, Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II 
arguably had no permanent effect of American society once these battles were won and peace 
restored). For a more complete discussion on how the United States has rebuilt themselves after 
engaging in major wars, see generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, 
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infringements on civil liberties have heightened our sensitivity to the importance of protecting 
civil liberties.  It must be recognized that if we lose our fight against terrorism, the civil liberties 
of all people, citizens and non-citizens alike, will no longer survive.285  Nevertheless, it cannot be 
ignored that detention theories are inherently flawed and thus, in the long term, the detention 
provisions under the Patriot Act, while possibly reasoned responses in the name of liberty and 
security, may ultimately fail in their goal to eliminate the terrorist threat to the United States.
It is not a matter of if, but instead a question of when, the power to potentially 
indefinitely detain a non-citizen found under § 412 of the Patriot Act will be challenged in the 
Supreme Court as a violation of the non-citizen’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.  In 
predicting how the Court would resolve the constitutionality of the Patriot Act’s detention 
provisions, it is important to remember the track record of the judiciary.  The judiciary has 
consistently deferred to the wishes of the political branches of government during times of crisis 
by finding the state interest in national security to be paramount to competing interests.286  For 
instance, during the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln established military courts to try 
those sympathizing with the Confederacy and suspended habeas corpus.287  Similarly, during 
World War I, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Eugene Debs for expressing his anti-
war sentiment.288  More recently, following the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II, 
the Supreme Court upheld an executive order which mandating the internment of both Japanese 
citizens and non-citizens based solely on their ancestry.289  While the current “war” on terrorism 
STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS (2001) (addressing 
what states that have just won major wars do with their newly acquired power).
285 See id.
286 See CHANG, supra note 145, at 136.
287 See Mathews, supra note 2, at 465-67.
288 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
289 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945).
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differs from in that the “war” on terrorism is not being waged against any particular nation and 
because Congress has not declared war as required by Article I of the Constitution,290 the 
Supreme Court would likely draw an analogy between  these historical instances and  the current 
state of affairs.  
The Supreme Court decided long ago that a formal declaration of war is not necessary for 
the Executive to wage war.291  During the Civil War, in determining what constituted a war the 
Court held in The Prize Cases292 that “war has been well defined to be that state in which a 
nation prosecutes its right by force.”293  In addition, the Court found that “war may exist without 
a declaration on either side” and that “it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties 
should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States.”294  Just like there was no 
formal declaration of war preceding the Civil War, in the current “war” on terrorism, Congress 
has made the functional equivalent of a declaration of war in it authorization of the use of force 
against al-Qaida.295  Therefore, as in The Prize Cases, this type of authorization may be 
sufficient for the Supreme Court to analogize the current state of affairs to instances where there 
were more traditional declarations of war and for the Court to take judicial notice that a state of 
war exists.296
290
 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
291 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
292 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
293 Id. at 666.
294 Id. at 668.
295 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 
2001) (stating that the act is an authorization of military force made pursuant to the War Powers 
Resolution).
296 Interestingly enough, the state of affairs following the Civil War provides further historical 
support for the notion that civil liberties may be restricted even without a formal declaration of 
war. The Reconstruction Act of 1867, passed in response to widespread Ku Klux Klan violence 
in the South, showed a willingness on the part of Congress to restrict civil liberty in times of 
national crisis, even though the nation was not at war.  See Matt J. O’Laughlin, Exingent 
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During World War II the United States was once again faced with a threat to national 
security when members of the German armed forces, carrying explosive, fuses, and timing 
devices, secretly proceeded in a submarine to the coast of the United States.297  Similar to 
government’s considerations in passing the Patriot Act, concerned that the current laws were not 
sufficient to protect the United States from these types of individuals, President Roosevelt 
quickly issued an order establishing a military commission298 for the trial of the saboteurs.299  All
eight German soldiers who landed in the United States were tried before the military 
commission, with six eventually being sentenced to death.300
Following their convictions, the German soldiers filed a petition for habeas corpus to 
challenge the constitutionality of their trial by military commission.301  In Ex parte Quirin, 302 the 
Circumstances: Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC L. REV. 
707, 714 (2002).  Although the Civil War had ended two years earlier, Congress believed it was 
necessary, in an effort to restore order, to institute military rule in the South.  See id.  After 
passing the Reconstruction Acts, Congress then restricted the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court to hear the issue, ensuring that it would not be held unconstitutional.  See id. The 
Reconstruction Acts laid out conditions for the readmission of states into the union, one of which 
was the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id.  Essentially, Congress coerced the 
votes of southerners through the use of military rule.  Without this restraint on liberty, it is likely 
that Fourteenth Amendment would not have been ratified. These circumstances suggest that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, at least in part, came to fruition by placing restraints on civil liberty.  
See id. at 715.
297 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1942).
298
 Similar to the Military Order passed by President Roosevelt during World War II, on 
November 13, 2001 President Bush also promulgated a Military Order authorizing the trial of 
non-citizens suspected of complicity in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  While an in-
depth discussion of President Bush’s Military Order is beyond the scope of this Comment, it has 
been addressed extensively elsewhere.  See, e.g., Christopher M. Evans, Terrorism on Trial: The 
President’s Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by 
Military Commission, 51 DUKE L.J. 1831 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military 
Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 320 (2002); 
Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting 
Terrorist Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2002).
299 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21-22.
300 Id. at 22-23; see also Evans, supra note 298, at 1842-43.
301 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23-24; see also Evans, supra note 298, at 1842-43.
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Supreme Court convened in a special term to hear arguments in the case of the petitioners.  Not 
surprisingly, the court dismissed the petitioner’s arguments and upheld their convictions 
reasoning that the President’s wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference 
from the courts.303  The opinion also established the presumption that presidential actions taken 
pursuant to the commander in chief power during wartime are valid, unless those actions are 
clearly in conflict with the Constitution.304  Chief Justice Stone wrote, “[T]he detention and trial 
of petitioners—ordered by the President in the declared exercise as Commander in Chief of the 
Army in time of war and of grave public danger—are not to be set aside by the courts without 
the clear conviction” that they are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.305
While true that the situation in which President Roosevelt authorized military 
commissions can be distinguished from state of affairs which precipitated the passing of the 
Patriot Act, a close reading of Quirin supports the contention that the Supreme Court would 
likely uphold the detention provisions of the Patriot Act.  In contrast to the invasion of the 
German soldiers and the circumstances which existed when President Roosevelt promulgated his 
order, the United States was not in the state of an armed conflict on the morning of September 
11, 2001, prior to the attacks.  In addition, unlike World War II, despite the president’s 
proclaimed “war on terrorism” the United States is not officially at war.  Nevertheless, the 
severity of the September 11 attacks, in both their purpose and effect, undoubtedly commenced a 
state of “quasi-war” in the United States.  The decision of the Supreme Court in Quirin clearly 
illustrates that during times of conflict and increased national security, civil liberties are not high 
priorities for the judges.  Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Quirin regarding the 
302
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303 Id. at 25.
304 Id. 
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appropriateness of the use of military tribunals primarily turned on the particular facts in the case 
including, the time in which the events in the case took place, the identity of the offenders, and 
the state of affairs of the nation.  This reasoning, when applied to the appropriateness of the 
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, supports the detention of non-citizens suspected of 
terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
In another famous World War II case, Korematsu v. United States,306 the Court upheld 
the evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry to relocation centers.307  Korematsu was convicted 
of disobeying the order by remaining in an area contrary to the order.308  In a short ten-page 
opinion the Court affirmed his conviction and held that the evacuation of people of Japanese 
ancestry was necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members 
of the group.309  In affirming his conviction the Court noted “the validity of action under the war 
power must be judged wholly in the context of war.  That action is not to be stigmatized as 
lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless.”310  The decision of the Court in 
Korematsu confirms the fact that judges are wary to strike down wartime measures during times 
of conflict and when the national security of the United States is threatened.  Thus, there is little 
reason to believe that the Supreme Court would depart from this line of decisions when 
interpreting the detention provisions of the Patriot Act.
305 Id.
306
 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
307 Id. at 218.
308 Id. at 215-216.
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Finally, and most significantly for determining the fate of the Patriot Act’s detention 
provisions, there is the decision of the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, which came down less than 
three months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.311
Zadvydas v. Davis combined two cases that had led to opposite results in the courts of 
appeals.  Both cases involved non-citizens who had enjoyed the status of lawful permanent 
resident after arriving in the United States as children.312  Kestutis Zadvydas was a non-citizen 
resident of the United States who was born to Lithuanian parents in a German displaced persons 
camp.313  After a drug conviction, he served two years in prison and was detained thereafter by 
the INS which ordered his removal.314  Because both Germany and Lithuania refused to accept 
Zadvydas as their own citizen, however, the INS held him beyond the ninety-day removal period 
allowed by the statute.315  Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit upheld the statute reasoning that 
although Zadvydas’s status as a permanent resident afforded him greater procedural due process 
rights, this status did not afford him greater substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.316
In essence the court refused, at least for detention purposes, to recognize a meaningful distinction 
between deportable non-citizens subject to final orders of removal and excludable non-
citizens.317  Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that Zadvydas’s continued detention did not 
constitute “permanent confinement” because his removal was not an absolute impossibility and 
because he could be released upon a determination that he no longer represented a flight risk or 
311 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
312 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682-86. 
313 Id. at 684.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 685; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1922 (discussing the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999)).
317 See Martin, supra note 43, at 69. 
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danger to the community.318  Therefore, because Zadvydas failed to sustain his burden to the INS 
by proving that he was not dangerous and releasable, and as long that the INS provided a 
procedure for periodic review of releasability coupled with good faith efforts to effectuate 
deportation, ongoing detention did not violate the Constitution.319
Similar to Zadvydas, Kim Ho Ma came to the United States from Cambodia and had been 
a resident non-citizen since the age of seven.320  After being convicted of manslaughter, he spent 
a little over two years in prison where upon release he was placed into the custody of the INS to 
begin removal proceedings.321  The INS detained Ma beyond the ninety-day period because 
Cambodia would not accept him.322  In contrast to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zadvydas, 
however, the Ninth Circuit refused to uphold the statute.323  Instead, the court construed the INA
to prohibit detention for more than a “reasonable time” beyond the ninety-day removal period.324
The court found that where, as in Ma’s case, no reasonable likelihood of removal exists, the 
statute did not authorize detention beyond ninety days.325
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the circuit split, 
consolidated them, vacated and remanded.326  The majority held that any law allowing the 
indefinite detention of deportable non-citizens would raise substantial constitutional concerns.327
To survive a constitutional challenge, the court reasoned that indefinite civil detention must 
318 See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1922.
319 See Martin, supra note 43, at 69.
320 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 686.
323 Id.; see also Martin, supra note 43, at 69-70.





occur in “non-punitive circumstances” where a “special justification” exists.328  Even assuming 
that the objectives for detaining individuals such as Zadvydas and Ma were non-punitive, the 
Court found no sufficient compelling special justification for their indefinite confinement once 
the likelihood of their repatriation became remote.329  In addition, the majority was not persuaded 
by the governments’ justifications for detention.  The government’s first justification for 
detention—preventing flight from removal proceedings—did not constitute enough of a 
justification for continued INS detention.330  Similarly, while the Court acknowledged that the 
government’s second justification—protecting the community from harm—was valid, the Court 
stressed that preventative detention based on dangerousness would be permitted only when it is 
imposed on highly dangerous individuals and only if there are “strong procedural protections” in 
place.331  The majority was skeptical of the INA’s post-order detention provision because it 
applied to a broad range of non-citizens rather than a narrow segment of the population, and 
because it offered minimal procedural protections.332
Nevertheless, in order to avoid finding the post-order provision unconstitutional, the 
Court construed the statute to permit incarceration beyond the ninety-day period only as long as 
removal remained “reasonably foreseeable.”333  In doing so, the majority established a 
presumption that detention of a deportable non-citizen is reasonable for six months following a 
final order of removal.334  After that time, the detained non-citizen may petition the government 
for release by showing “good reason” to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 
328 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
329 See id; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1923.
330 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1923.
331 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1923-
24.
332 See id. at 691-92; 1923-24.
333 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
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in the reasonably foreseeable future.335  The government must rebut such a showing to continue 
holding the non-citizen in custody.336
Despite the Court’s expression of serious doubt about the constitutionality of the INA’s
post-order detention mandate, however, the majority did recognize, in language that now appears 
prescient, that the cases before it did not require it “to consider terrorism or other special 
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention and 
for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of  
national security.”337  In doing so, the Court essentially carved out a potential exception for 
certain non-citizen terrorists and recognized that terrorism creates a type of public fear that may 
not be present with other national threats of security.  The acknowledgement by the majority of 
the genuine danger represented by terrorism or other exceptional circumstances seems to eerily 
foreshadow the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent struggles our nation is now 
faced with following the unprecedented attacks.  While lessons from the past may counsel 
against such a rule that affords heightened judicial deference to the political branches in cases 
that implicate national security, this loophole created by the majority undoubtedly gives the 
political branches room to maneuver and for the Supreme Court to utilize detention in the current 
war on terrorism.  The Zadvydas decision therefore would not require the release of non-citizens 
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country.  What the Patriot Act appears to do is effectively codify this exception requiring the 
continued detention of removable non-citizens suspected of terrorism.338
The Patriot Act’s provisions on indefinite detention for certified non-citizens suspected of 
terrorism are likely to be ruled constitutional given both the current heightened popular 
awareness of the national security threat posed by non-citizens living in the United States with 
the intent to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Americans and because the detention provisions 
of the Act exceed the Zadvydas standard regarding suspected terrorists held on an indefinite 
basis.  First, § 412(b) specifically provides judicial review of suspected non-citizen terrorists 
held on an indefinite basis.339  Second, the new law proscribes fixed time limits for review of the 
Attorney General’s initial certification.  Section 412(a)(6) provides that an alien whose “removal 
is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future may be detained for additional periods of up to 
six months if release threatens national security or the safety of an individual or community.”340
In addition, § 412(a)(7) requires the Attorney General to review the certification every six 
months and allows the suspected non-citizen terrorist to request a reconsideration of the 
certification every six months.341  It is only if all these provisions are satisfied that the terrorist 
suspect may be subject to potential indefinite detention.  Therefore, if the Court stands by its 
decision in Zadvydas and follows precedent of this decision and other decisions passed down in 
times of crisis, it is unlikely that the detention provisions of the Patriot Act will be struck down 
as an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of non-citizens.342
338 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
339 See id. at § 412(b) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
340 See id. at § 412(a)(6) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
341 See id. at § 412(a)(7) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
342
 Finally, the most telling indication of how the Supreme Court will rule on the detention 
provisions of the Patriot Act may be found in the words spoken by Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
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2. Are the Detention Provisions of the Patriot Act Justifiable?
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures.  During this uncertain time, it is 
impossible for the United States to predict the future with any type of certainty.  History has 
warned us that in a struggle against evil, the traditional civil liberties of some individuals may 
have to be curtailed.  Nevertheless, history also assures us that once the emergency is over, the 
provisions which adversely compromised traditional civil liberties will be eliminated and peace 
can be restored.343
The detention provisions of the Patriot Act, while certainly hostile to the traditional civil 
liberties of non-citizens, can be defended as a reasoned and justifiable response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.   While the provisions do subject more individuals than ever to 
deportation on terrorism grounds due to the newly expanded definitions of the terms “terrorist 
activity” and “terrorist organization,” safeguards have been built into the Patriot Act in an effort 
to adequately protect non-citizens from the possibility of arbitrary indefinite detention. Some of 
these protections include a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to delegate his 
certification power to the Deputy Attorney General alone,344 a requirement to initiate removal 
Day O’Connor.  Upon her visit to the World Trade Center site in New York shortly after the 
terrorist attacks O’Connor commented that, “we are likely to experience more restrictions on 
personal freedom than has even been the case in this country.”  Linda Greenhouse, A Nation 
Challenged: The Supreme Court; In New York Visit, O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom,
NY TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.  This statement by O’Connor is also extremely important 
because she is often considered the swing vote on the current Supreme Court.  Her views are 
therefore crucial.  In addition to this comment, her concurring opinion in Foucha may indicate 
that she is more open to some kinds of indefinite detention than the other members of the Court 
who made up the Zadvydas majority.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: 
The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 384 (2002) 
(discussing the future of the Zadvydas  decision).
343
 See Ting, supra note 144, at 1147.
344 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
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proceedings or bring criminal charges within seven days of the commencement of detention,345 a 
limitation on the detention of non-citizens who cannot be removed and those non-citizens who 
are waiting to be removed if it is determined that the release of these non-citizens would threaten 
national security or public safety,346 mandatory review of certification by the Attorney General 
every six months,347 and a provision for judicial review through the filing of a habeas petition 
and appeals.348
Finally, and quite possibly most significantly, in contrast to the situation in the United 
Kingdom, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were perpetrated on American soil.  After 
the attacks, it was discovered that the State Department had issued visas to all nineteen hijackers 
responsible for the terrorist attacks.349  These lapses in immigration law enforcement brought to 
light how our relatively open borders and open society make us an easy target for terrorist 
activity.  Consequently, the federal government was forced to take action fast.  While the 
detention of non-citizens as authorized under the Patriot Act may not be the best solution or even 
the most effective approach to combat terrorism, it represents a reasoned response to a difficult 
situation.  After all, if the United States does not fight terrorism, civil liberties as a whole will not 
survive as there will be no one left to fight for freedom and democracy.350  The civil liberty that 
the United States government should focus on at this crucial time is that of all people, both 
American and non-Americans, to live their live free from the threat of terrorism.351  This is a 





349 See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1931.
350 See Ting, supra note 144, at 1147.
351 See id.
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detention provisions of the Patriot Act.  Nevertheless, while the continuing threat posed by 
terrorism may justify the detention provisions, the United States must remain mindful that if and 
when the situation stabilizes, the detention measures should be reviewed to ensure that the civil 
liberties of non-citizens are not unnecessarily being truncated.352  In addition, even given the 
continuing threat new of terrorist attacks, it is essential for the United States to abide by the 
explicit safeguards which have been outlined in the Patriot Act to protect against the possibility 
of potential arbitrary indefinite detention.353
B. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
1.  Will the European Court Uphold the United Kingdoms Derogation from ECHR under 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001?
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s potential reasoning in upholding the Patriot Act, 
it is questionable whether the European Court would rule that the detention provisions of Anti-
352
 This Comment is not arguing that the threat of terrorism will be eradicated anytime soon or 
even that it will ever be completely eliminated.  The development of international terrorism has 
placed the world under a real and most likely permanent threat.  In fact, this view is supported by 
President Bush himself who believes it is going to be way beyond our lifetimes before the war on 
terrorism comes to an end.  See Padilla v. Bush No. 02 Civ. 4445, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086, 
at *10-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2002) (summarizing the government's June 11, 2002 arguments in 
reply to Padilla's then-pending motion to vacate the material witness statute).  Instead, what this 
Comment is arguing is that the new and expanded detention powers under the Patriot Act should 
by both limited in time and confined to periods of emergency and uncertainty.  
353
 Most notably, the United States government must ensure that non-citizens certified as 
terrorists have access to the judicial review procedures explicitly outlined in the Patriot Act 
which enable certified terrorists to file a habeas petition to protest their certification and 
detention.  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).  In 
addition, it is important that the Attorney General review the certification of each non-citizen 
every six months without exception.  See id. Finally, it is mandatory that the Attorney General 
submit reports to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate every six months regarding: (1) the number of non-
citizens detained under these provisions; (2) the grounds for the certifications; (3) the 
nationalities of those non-citizens certified; (4) the length of the detention for each certified non-
citizen; and (5) the number of non-citizens certified who—(A) were granted relief from removal; 
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terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 are valid.  Irrespective of a specific terrorist threat or 
independent terrorist attack against the United Kingdom, because of the nation’s relationship to 
the United States, it cannot be ignored that the nation is a target for terrorist activity.  While true 
that traditionally the United Kingdom has been afforded great deference when addressing 
terrorist threats and while there are purported safeguards contained within ATCSA to ensure that 
the detention provisions of the Act are reviewed and remain temporary, the European Court will 
most likely find that the detention provisions of ATCSA have proceeded too far in the name of 
national security and rule that the United Kingdom has not made a valid derogation from ECHR 
under Article 15.  Given the current state of affairs in the United Kingdom, unlike the Patriot 
Act, not only are the detention measures of ATCSA unnecessary and disproportionate, they also 
fail to provide adequate procedural safeguards to protect non-citizens from arbitrary detention.
While from the beginning, both the European Court and Commission have indicated that 
they will not abdicate jurisdiction over Article 15 questions, both have assumed an extremely 
deferential attitude towards governmental assertions of conformity with requirements of Article 
15.354  Governments historically fare well when their decisions concerning the existence of a 
particular situation of emergency are reviewed by the European Court.  Nevertheless, in regards 
to the United Kingdom’s recent derogation, there is reason to believe that the Court would rule 
differently.355
(B) were removed; (C) the Attorney General had determined are no longer non-citizens who 
should be certified; or (D) were released from detention.  See id.
354
 Gross, supra note 98, at 492.
355 See id. at 493.  The traditional deference shown to member countries is the result of such 
factors as tremendous delays in bringing cases before the Commission and the Court, the lack of 
a fact-finding mechanism for the Commission and the Court, and the restriction on the 
Commission and the Court to initiate an investigation into a specific situation in a state party. 
Instead, procedural rules require the Commission and the Court to await a formal application by 
another state party to the Convention or by an individual.  Id.  However, it is the doctrine of the 
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Several significant cases have come before the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Commission on Human Rights356 that have judged the efforts of the United Kingdom 
to control terrorism in Northern Ireland within the constraints of ECHR.357  For the purposes of 
this Comment, only those cases which addressed the detention provisions of the United 
Kingdom’s terrorist legislation after the passing of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
“margin of appreciation” which is the main mechanism by which this deferential attitude is 
implemented.  This doctrine and the jurisprudence developed around it have resulted in bringing 
a significant element of subjectivity into the identification of public emergencies and as a result 
have undermined the ability of European Commission and Court to formulate rules based on 
strict requirements opting instead for vague standards that increase the leeway for discretion and 
flexibility.  Id. at 495.
The margin of appreciation doctrine essentially means that when reviewing whether a 
public emergency exists in a particular case or whether certain governmental emergency 
measures were in fact “strictly necessary,” the Commission and the Court will generally not 
interfere with the state’s judgment on the matter if it falls within a certain margin of appreciation. 
Id. at 496.  If in derogating a state’s appreciation is at least on the margin of its powers under 
Article 15, the Commission and Court usually rules in its favor.  Id.  The rationale is that in such 
cases the public’s interest in an effective government and in the maintenance of order should 
prevail and that the national government is in the best position to balance the conflicting 
considerations of the public interest and complex factors involved in preserving law and order in 
the face of public emergency.  Id.  This is because the national government is presumed to be 
more familiar than the Commission or the Court with the particular circumstances which face the 
nation.  Id. at 497.  In fact, invalidating a state’s judgment on a matter is only possible when the 
judgment is entirely outside the margin.  Id.  Thus, as it is nearly impossible to obtain a decision 
against the national government in situations alleged to amount to “public emergencies 
threatening the life of a nation,” there is little reason to believe that the previous practices of the 
Commission and Court in avoiding an independent review of the evidence and the tendency to 
succumb to the position of the national government will be abandoned in addressing the 
detention provisions under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.  See id.
356
 Both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights 
were established under Article 19 of ECHR.  See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 19.  The 
Commission may start an investigation into a complaint alleging that a State Party has violated 
ECHR upon an interstate complaint (i.e., a complaint filed by another member state) under 
Article 24 of ECHR or upon an application of an individual.  See id. arts. 4-25.  If an application 
is found to be admissible by the Commission, the Commission first attempts to achieve a friendly 
settlement between the parties. See id. art. 30.  In the case where no settlement can be reached, 
the Commission then has the ability to refer the case to the Court.  For a more detailed 
explanation of how ECHR and the European Court and Commission function, see generally 
JANIS ET AL., supra note 206 (providing a broad overview of how the European System operates).
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Provisions) Act of 1974 (PTA 1974) and Northern Ireland (Emergency Procedures) Act of 1973 
(EPA 1973) will be addressed here.358
Article 5.3 of ECHR provides that everyone lawfully arrested or detained “shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power, 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.”359  The issue in 
Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom360 involved four individuals who were arrested under § 
12 of PTA as amended in 1984.361  These individuals were detained between four and six days 
under PTA on suspicion of involvement in Northern Ireland terrorism.362  This section of PTA 
proscribed the IRA and in § 12(1) provided that a law enforcement agent could arrest without 
warning any person whom he had reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a terrorist.363  Section 
12(4) provided for forty-eight hours initial detention and § 12(5) provided that detention could be 
357 See generally JACKSON, supra note 6 (studying the conflicts which have arisen between the 
United Kingdom, the European Court and ECHR).  
358
 In 1971, prior to the enactment of either the 1973 EPA or the 1974 PTA, in the case of Ireland 
v. United Kingdom, the Irish government contended that measures such as the detention and 
internment without trial as well as certain interrogation techniques introduced under the Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 violated Articles 3, 5, and 6 of ECHR.  
The Commission concluded that although the powers of detention and internment did violate the 
provisions of Article 5 of the European Convention, this detention without trial could be justified 
under Article 15 as being strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.  In addition, the 
Commission concluded that the use of certain interrogation techniques such as depravation of 
food and standing against a wall amounted to torture under Article 3 of ECHR.  See Ireland v. 
United Kingdom 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1979-80).  This decision focused primarily on the 
interrogation techniques and procedures used by Britain rather than on the powers of detention.  
What is significant, however, is that the decision in Ireland both affirmatively recognized that an 
emergency did in fact exist in the United Kingdom, even though there was a continuous crisis 
and not a temporary public emergency.  Additionally, it is important to recognize the expansion 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Commission in this case.  Both of these factors may 
have direct implications on how the European Court would rule on the detention provisions of 
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. See Gross, supra note 98, at 469-73. 
359 See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 5.
360
 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1989).
361 See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 120-22.
362 See id.
80
extended by five additional days.364  None of the four was brought before a judge and none was 
charged after subsequent release.365  Brogan and the other three detainees argued that their 
detention violated Article 5.3 of ECHR because they were not taken before a magistrate.
The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the extrajudicial powers of arrest 
and detention contained in PTA were incompatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations under 
ECHR.366 Being that none of the four suspects was brought immediately before a judge, the 
European Court had a fairly easy time of finding a breach of Article 5.3.  The European Court 
ruled that even the shortest period for which one of the four individuals had been held, four days 
and six hours, violated ECHR.367
The British government, obviously dejected with the court’s ruling, insisted that it needed 
to retain the seven day detention period found under PTA.368  In response, Britain announced that 
it would derogate from its ECHR obligations under Article 15:369
There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns of organized terrorism 
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland which have manifested themselves in 
activities which have included repeated murder, attempted murder, maiming, intimidation 
and violent civil disturbance and in bombing and fire raising which have resulted in 
death, injury and widespread destruction of property.  As a result, a public emergency 
within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the Convention exists in the United Kingdom.370
363 See id. at 122; see also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 48-9.
364 See id. at 123-24; see also  JACKSON, supra note 6, at 49. 
365 See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 122;  see also Gross, supra note 98, at 477.
366 See Patricia M. Roche, The United Kingdom’s Obligation to Balance Human Rights and its 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Case of Brogan and Others, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 328, 346 
(1989-90).
367 See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 135-36; see also Gross, supra note 98, at 477. 
368 See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 260.
369 See id.  Article 15 is a public emergency exception contained in ECHR which allows member 
countries to derogate from their obligations under ECHR under certain circumstances. See
ECHR, supra note 14, art. 15.  Article 15 was discussed more extensively in Part III.B.3 of this 
Comment and is useful to keep in mind when analyzing the detention provisions of ATCSA and 
determining the validity of the British government’s derogation from ECHR in passing the Act.
370 See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 260.
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Adhering to the European Court’s reasoning in Brogan, it seems likely that the detention 
provisions of ATCSA would be found to violate ECHR.  In Brogan, the Court held that the fact 
that a detained person is not charged or brought before a court does not in itself amount to a 
violation of ECHR.371  In addition, the court believed that a violation of ECHR could not arise if 
the arrested person was released promptly before any judicial review of his detention would have 
been feasible.372  If the detained person was not released promptly, however, the court held that 
he would be entitled to an appearance before a judge or judicial officer.373  In assessing and 
interpreting notion of “promptness” the court recognized the special problems associated with 
the investigation of terrorist offenses.374  Nevertheless, the court did not believe that the terrorist 
threat which faced the United Kingdom justified the disposal of prompt judicial control.375  Thus, 
the court adhered to a narrow interpretation of the meaning of the word “promptness” in order to 
ensure that the rights of detained individuals were protected.376  Under this interpretation, even 
the four days and six hours spent in police custody by one of the detainees was outside the strict 
constraints as to the time permitted by ECHR.377
Applying the considerations of the Court in Brogan to ATCSA, it is unlikely that the 
Court would uphold the detention provisions of Part 4.  ATCSA contains no explicit provision 
which requires the Secretary of State to commence proceedings within a certain period of time.  
A non-citizen could therefore be held for an indefinite period of time without being charged with 
any type of immigration violation or criminal activity.  Thus, the Court would likely conclude 
371 Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 133.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 135.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 134-35.
377 Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 136.
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that individuals held pursuant to the detention provisions of ATCSA are not brought promptly 
before a judicial authority or released promptly following their arrest.  Identical to the Court’s 
reasoning in Brogan, “the undoubted fact that the arrest and detention of the applicant were 
inspired by the legitimate aim of protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on 
its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of Article 5(3).”378
In addition, as noted by the Court in Brogan, the remedy of habeas corpus was available 
to the applicants in that case.379  Thus, even though they did not avail themselves of such 
proceedings, the detained individuals in Brogan did have an opportunity to have the lawfulness 
of their arrest and detention reviewed by a competent court.380  Under ATCSA, however, those 
detained under Part 4 are not afforded the safeguard of habeas corpus.  Instead, ATCSA 
precludes regular judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decisions under §§ 21 and 23 and 
allows these decisions only to be questions in legal proceedings before the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC).381  Thus, unlike the detained individuals in Brogan, those arrested 
and detained under ATCSA have no right to bring proceedings in order to have a court quickly 
determine the lawfulness of their detention.
The validity of the British government’s derogation from ECHR was subsequently
challenged in Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom,382 once again by detainees who were 
contesting the length of their detention.  After being arrested in 1989, Brannigan was held 




381 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, §§ 21, 25; see also infra Part III.B.2 for a 
more in-depth discussion of SIAC.
382
 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539 (1994).
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men were released without charge.383  The facts of this case were, therefore, substantially similar 
to those of Brogan.  This time, however, the British government conceded that Article 5(3)’s 
promptness requirement was not met but invoked as a defense to the derogation notice it 
submitted following the European Court’s decision in Brogan, claiming that the Article 5(3) 
violation was justified under Article 15.384
The detainees argued that given the “quasi-permanent” nature of the state of emergency 
in Northern Ireland, the margin of appreciation385 accorded the United Kingdom should be 
narrowed, especially given the court’s ruling in Brogan that judicial review was one of the 
fundamental requirements of a democratic society.386  Despite this argument, the majority of the 
European Court instead adopted a broad conception of the margin of appreciation and found in 
the United Kingdom’s favor.  According to the preconditions for derogation387 that (1) there 
existed a “war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation,” (2) the derogation 
was “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and (3) the measures were not 
inconsistent with the State’s other international obligations, the court determined that the 
383 See Gross, supra note 98, at 480.  Unfortunately, McBride was killed before the European 
Court could rule on his case.  He was one of three people killed at a Sinn Fein Center by an RUC 
officer, who killed himself as well a few hours after the murders.  See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 
54.
384 See Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 551-52.
385
 The European Court has consistently held that the court plays a limited role in review of a 
member country’s declaration of a public emergency under Article 15.  The Court generally 
grants member countries this margin of appreciation because it recognizes that each member 
state is primarily responsible for its own survival and stability.  That is not to say however that 
member nations enjoy absolute deference from the Court regarding the scope of derogation from 
their obligations under ECHR.  For a more in-depth discussion of the margin of appreciation and 
how it operates see Part V of this comment.  See also Gross, supra note 98, at 495-99.  See 
generally Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 380 (1997) (arguing that the European Court’s use of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
when interpreting ECHR needs to be more consistent).
386 See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 54.
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derogation was valid.388  It decided that as far as the “strictly required” question was concerned, 
the government had not overstepped its margin of appreciation in its decision to exclude judicial 
control as part of the process of extending detention.389  The court concluded that adequate and 
effective safeguards existed against potential abuse of the arrest and detention powers given to 
the government’s agents.390
While there are similarities between the circumstances in Brannigan and the current state 
of affairs in the United Kingdom, there are also differences which distinguish the detention 
provisions under ATCSA and thus make it likely that the Court, even despite their ruling in 
Brannigan, would strike down the detention measures of ATCSA.  In finding that the United 
Kingdom had not exceeded their margin of appreciation, the Court strongly emphasized the 
various effective safeguards which were imbedded in the legislation at issue in Brannigan.391
The Court felt that these safeguards provided an important measure of protection against 
arbitrary detention.392  In contrast, these safeguards that the Court relied on in upholding the 
United Kingdom’s derogation in Brannigan, are glaringly absent from ATCSA.
First, the remedy of habeas corpus available in Brannigan, which was readily available to 
test the lawfulness of the original arrest and detention, does not exist under ATCSA.393  Second, 
unlike those detained in Brannigan, individuals detained under ATCSA do not have an absolute 
and legally enforceable right to consult a solicitor after forty-eight hours from the time of 
387
 The preconditions for a valid derogation under Article 15 of ECHR were explored in more 
detail in Parts III.B.3 and IV.B.1 of this Comment.   
388 See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 260.
389 See Gross, supra note 98, at 481.
390 See id.




arrest.394  Instead, because of the unconventional procedure before SIAC, an individual’s legal 
representatives will be chosen for him by the Attorney-General (or other appropriate law officer) 
and will not be responsible to the individual.395  Third, the Court in Brannigan recognized that 
the legislation at issue had been kept under regular independent review and that it was subject to 
regular renewal.396  While ATCSA does contain a review provision and requires that there be a 
review of the detention provisions by a person appointed by the Secretary of State within
fourteen months of ATCSA’s coming into force,397 as well as provide for the expiration of the 
detention provisions fifteen months after ATCSA’s enactment,398 the effectiveness of these 
provisions has yet to be seen.  In addition, the review provisions of ATCSA are distinguishable 
from the legislation at issue in Brannigan, as the review of the detention provisions under 
ATCSA are not subject to independent review.  Instead, it is the Secretary of State, the same 
individual who determines who will and will not be certified as a terrorist under ATCSA, who 
appoints a person to review the legislation.399  Furthermore, while § 29 does provide that the 
detention provisions will expire after fifteen months, the Secretary of State (by order subject to 
approval by both Houses), can revive the detention provisions.400
Finally, the Court in Brannigan recognized the limited scope of the derogation and how it 
was designed to address the specific terrorist threat posed by Northern Ireland.401  In Brannigan, 
the derogation was in response to organized terrorism directly connected to the affairs of the 
British Government.  This terrorism was occurring on a regular basis over a period of time and 
394 Id. at 575-76.
395 See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 217-18.
396 Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 576.
397 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 28.
398 Id. § 29.
399 Id. § 28.
400 Id. §29.
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was directly affecting British citizens.402  Conversely, unlike the state of affairs in the United 
Kingdom at the time Brannigan was decided where the derogation was a reasoned response to a 
situation rooted in the everyday lives of British citizens,403 the derogation order under ATCSA 
under the current circumstances does not seem justified from the view of the general British 
public. Unlike the legislation in question in Brannigan, the detention provisions of ATCSA have 
little to do with the recent developments in international security and are not carefully targeted at 
the exceptional situation with which they were designed to deal.
In addition, the dissents of the court suggested that some of the judges on the European 
Court were growing tired of the persistent state of emergency and consequent derogations in 
Northern Ireland.  For example, Judge Pettiti of France refused to concede that the independence 
of judge might be undermined by participating in the decision whether or not to extend a period 
of detention.404  Similarly, the dissenting opinions of Judges DeMeyer and Makarczyk and the 
concurring opinions of Judges Russo and Martens together suggested that the duration of the 
derogations by the United Kingdom and the expansive broadening of the margin of appreciation 
granted the United Kingdom were becoming problematic.405  These opinions, while not those of 
the great majority of the court, nevertheless may prove important when the European Court 
finally is forced to rule on the detention provisions enacted by the Anti-Terrorism Crime Security 
Act 2001.
Lending some support to the conclusion that the European Commission and Court would 
possibly uphold the detention provisions contained in Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
401 Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 576.
402 See Black-Branch, supra note 151, at 29.
403 See id.
404 See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 55.
405 See id.
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2001 are the measures in place to ensure that the United Kingdom continually reviews the 
necessity of the emergency powers and that the derogation from its obligations under ECHR last 
only as long as the emergency lasts.  ATCSA requires review of the sections concerning the 
detention of suspected non-citizen terrorists and provides rules that the government must abide 
by in the review process.406  These rules include specifying the number of people who must 
review the sections, the timing of the review, and the presentation of a report on the review to 
both the Secretary of State and Parliament.407  Furthermore, the purported temporary nature of 
the detention measures will similarly be an important factor in determining whether the 
Commission and Court will support the Act’s detention provisions. The Act limits the Secretary 
of State’s power to certify and detain suspected non-citizen terrorists by explicitly stating that the 
detention provisions found under §§ 21-23 will expire as of November 10, 2006.408  Because 
these measures may help to ensure that the British government will not abuse its powers and that 
the measures taken in response to the public emergency are narrowly tailored to the 
circumstances required by the emergency, it is possible, although not likely, that the Commission 
and Court would uphold the validity of the detention provisions.
Overall however, the lack of procedural safeguards and the highly suspect and 
disproportional nature of the detention measures contained in ATCSA, makes it likely that the 
European Court would not uphold the detention provisions.  While the European Court has been 
fairly deferential to British claims of exigency in the past and has often afforded the British a 
wide margin of appreciation when the nation has been faced with similar difficult situations in 
dealing with the threat posed by suspected non-citizen terrorists, the current situation is 
406 See Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 28.
407 See id. §§ 28, 122.
408 See id. § 29.
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distinguishable from the previous terrorist threats the United Kingdom has confronted.409  While 
the traditional deference consistently afforded to the United Kingdom combined with the fact 
that the Act contains a clause that purportedly makes the detention of suspected non-citizen 
terrorists a temporary measure,410 cannot be ignored, it is improbable that the European Court 
would uphold the detention provisions as a valid and proportional response to the threat of 
terrorism that exists in the United Kingdom.  
2. Can the Detention Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 be 
Justified?
One of the key questions regarding the passing of ATCSA and the validity of the 
detention provisions has been whether the United Kingdom has correctly concluded that it faces 
a public emergency within the meaning of Article 15 of ECHR and has taken only those steps 
required by the circumstances of global terrorism to protect the life of the nation.  As previously 
discussed, the detention of a non-citizen without the intention or authority to deport him clearly 
violates Article 5(1)(f) of ECHR as the Convention only permits the detention of non-citizens if 
deportation proceedings have been initiated. Consequently, in order to meet their obligations 
under ECHR, the United Kingdom had to declare a state of emergency to temporarily suspend its 
obligations under ECHR as permitted under Article 15 of the Convention.  Article 15 applies 
only to an exceptional crisis or emergency situation which affects the entire population and 
constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of the State.411  Therefore, despite the 
fact that the European Court would afford a wide margin of discretion to the United Kingdom if 
409 See, e.g., Brannigan 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539 (1994) (finding that the United Kingdom’s 
derogation from ECHR under Article 15 was justified).  See also Gross, supra note 98, at 492-93 
(discussing how governments often fare well when their decisions concerning the existence of a 
particular situation of emergency are reviewed by the European Court).
410 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 29.
411
 Wadham, supra note 150, at 1074.
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the derogation was challenged, it is doubtful that the situation in the United Kingdom has 
reached such crisis proportions as to justify derogation from ECHR. 
In attempting to justify § 23 of ATCSA, which allows an individual who is certified as a 
suspected terrorist, the British government explained: 
Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 contains an extended 
power to arrest and detain a foreign national where it is intended to remove or deport the 
person from the United Kingdom because the Secretary of State believes that his 
presence is a risk to national security and suspects him of being an international terrorist, 
but where such removal or deportation is not for the time being possible.412
The British Government’s explicit derogation statements emphasized that many of the 
victims of the September 11 attacks were British citizens.413  The attack, however, did not target 
Britons exclusively.  There were victims from over seventy countries, including those nations 
who are also Members states within the Council of Europe.  Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
these countries were equally affected by the terrorist attacks, none of them have found it 
necessary to issue derogations orders from ECHR is an effort to protect its citizens from further 
terrorist attacks.414  The British government failed to explain why the United Kingdom should be 
more affected than other countries.415  In addition, in passing ATCSA the Government admitted 
that there was no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat in the United Kingdom.416
412
 Black-Branch, supra note 151, at 22.
413 See id. at 26.  At least one-hundred British citizens were killed in the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks—the largest number of Britons ever killed in a day outside war.  See Steven 
Morris & Jeevan Vasagar, British Death Toll Reaches into the Hundreds, Most Britons Ever 
killed in a Day Outside War, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,551735,00.html.
414 See id. 
415
 In fact, even Germany, where is has been learned that several of the September 11 hijackers 
resided before perpetrating the attacks, has refused to issue a derogation order from Article 5 of 
ECHR.  See id. 
416 See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 216.
90
For these reasons, it is far from certain that the United Kingdom is justified in arguing that there 
is currently a public emergency which threatens the lives of British citizens.
In discussing the United Kingdom’s responsibilities as a member of ECHR, it is 
important to acknowledge that the power of the United Kingdom to derogate from its obligations 
under ECHR is significant.  This is especially evident in comparing the powers of both the 
United Kingdom and the United States to protect the rights of non-citizens.  The ability for the 
United Kingdom to so easily and effortlessly derogate from their obligations demonstrates that 
the civil liberties of non-citizens are subject to the wishes of the government.417  In contrast, in 
the United States, where undoubtedly the impact of the September 11 attacks has been much 
greater than that in the United Kingdom, individuals are protected through the Constitution and 
through an explicit Bill of Rights which ensures that certain fundamental civil liberties cannot be 
entirely curtailed.418  Furthermore, unlike in the United Kingdom, judges in the United States 
have the power to strike down legislation which is unconstitutional and inconsistent with the 
rights non-citizens.419  Thus, under the Patriot Act, the judicial branch effectively acts as a check 
on the power of the other branches of government to protect the rights of non-citizens.  
Conversely, ATCSA provides no such protection to non-citizens subject to the legislation’s 
detention measures.
Furthermore, not only does Article 15(1) of ECHR require a public emergency before 
allowing  derogation from ECHR, but also requires that measures derogating from Government 
obligations under the Convention must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.420
In addition to § 23 discussed above, other provisions relating to the detention of non-citizens 
417 See Black-Branch, supra note 151, at 29-30.
418 See id. at 30.
419 See id.
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certified under the Act are clearly hard to defend as strictly necessary given the present situation 
in the United Kingdom.  For example, §§ 25 and 26 of ATCSA unjustifiably preclude habeas 
corpus proceedings as well as exclude regular judicial review of the Secretary of State’s 
decisions to certify and consequently indefinitely detain a non-citizen suspected of terrorism 
without the right to a trial.421  ATCSA provides that such decisions and actions can only be 
questioned in legal proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
and thus ousts intervention by courts.422  Furthermore, procedures before SIAC are 
unconventional: The non-citizen does not have a right to either be present at the hearing or even 
to be provided with the specific reasons for the decisions being made regarding his detention.423
In addition, the non-citizen has no choice of legal representation.424  Instead, his legal 
representation is chosen for him by the government and is not even responsible to the non-
citizen.425  Finally, and in direct contrast to the Patriot Act, which provides that a non-citizen 
must be charged within seven days of being arrested, non-citizens detained pursuant to ATCSA 
can be held without charge or trial for an indefinite period of time.426  The prisoner essentially is 
charged and convicted of being a terrorist without the chance of even being brought before a 
judge.
The United Kingdom undoubtedly faced a difficult dilemma in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11.  The government, however, failed in striking a balance between 
420 See id. at 26.
421 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, §§ 25, 26.
422 See id. §§ 26, 27.
423 See Tomkins, supra note 7, at 217-18.
424 See id.
425 See id. at 218.
426 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NEWS RELEASE, UK, GOVERNMENT IN THE DOCK FOR 
INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL (2002), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/uk07172002.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
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protecting the civil liberties of non-citizens on the one hand and preventing terrorism on the 
other.  In light of the above mentioned provisions of ATCSA, it is nearly impossible to conclude 
that the measures implemented under Part 4 of ATCSA are commensurate with the current state 
of affairs in the United Kingdom.  The government essentially took advantage of the terrorist 
attacks in the United States to pass a raft of coercive and disproportionate measures that are not 
targeted at any exceptional situation which they were purported to address.  Consequently, it is 
hard to argue that the present circumstances constitute any type of emergency in the United 
Kingdom or that the detention provisions in Part 4 of ATCSA are strictly necessary to deal with 
the situation as it currently exists in the country.  The United Kingdom should look more closely 
to other countries, both those in the European Union and in particular the United States, for 
alternative means of monitoring terrorist suspect without denying them the basic principles of 
liberty and justice.
CONCLUSION
After September 11, 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom recognized the 
vulnerability of their borders.  With the passage of the Patriot Act and ATCSA, the governments 
of both nations have many new tools available to combat the threat of terrorism within their 
borders.  With this unprecedented power, however, also comes new responsibility and the 
obligation to learn from past mistakes.  
Through the Patriot Act and ATCSA, the United States and the United Kingdom 
respectively have resorted to trying to prevent another attack by detaining non-citizens suspected 
of terrorism who are in some way associates with those who have been identified in connection 
with prior terrorist activities.  History has taught us, however, that the theory of internment does 
not work.  While a typical response to terrorism is an effort to remove dangerous factors from 
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society, the detention strategy is inherently flawed because removing a volatile element from a 
society does not defuse its destructive nature but merely transplants it.427  For instance, while this 
strategy has been used extensively by the British in Northern Ireland, the British have found that 
they have detained largely the wrong people and often even when the detentions have proved 
effective, they have had to effect of alienating a much larger group than were originally 
sympathetic to the terrorists.428  As Lord Dubs, a member of the British government, declared in 
1998 when debating the detention provisions in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Bill:
[i]n this Bill the decision have been taken to get rid of the power of internment.  Frankly 
it has not worked.  The government cannot see any circumstances in which they would 
wish to use the power of internment.  It is fundamentally a process that is against the rule 
of law and undermines democratic principles.  The government believe that to get rid of 
the power is sensible…we do not believe that it in any way weakens the power of the 
government to deal with terrorism.  The use last time of internment to deal with terrorism 
was a failure.429
Furthermore, irrespective of effectiveness, it is essential for the governments of the 
United States and the United Kingdom to look at the effect of the detention provisions contained 
in the Patriot Act and ATCSA on civil liberties as a whole.  While on the one hand, these 
countries must be permitted to create greater security from future attacks in an effort to protect 
its own citizens, on the other hand, it is not permissible for them to trample on basic civil 
liberties of non-citizens in doing so.  As a result of the expanded definitions of terrorism and 
terrorist activities, as well as the detention provisions contained in both the Patriot Act and 
427 See Clive Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against Terrorism: 
Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1, 17 (1997).
428 See Bonner, supra note 31, at 174-75; see generally CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES (1984) (examining and comparing the policies that 
have been used against urban terrorism, and evaluating their effectiveness).
429
 Tomkins, supra note 7, at 214.
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ATCSA, non-citizens who are suspected of terrorism in both countries may now find themselves 
subject to detention with the potential for arbitrary indefinite detention a generally available 
option for both governments. 
Nevertheless, despite the legitimate concerns that the internment of non-citizens 
suspected of terrorism raises regarding how far the United States and the United Kingdom can 
proceed in the name of national security, and besides the fact that detention is ineffective as a 
means to combat terrorism, it cannot be ignored that the world is a much different place than it 
was prior to September 11, 2001.  Understandably, and despite the infringement of civil liberties 
and freedoms, the United States and the United Kingdom were tempted by the ability to control 
and restrict the rights of those who were thought to be capable of perpetrating another attack.  In 
comparing the Patriot Act and ATCSA, however, it becomes apparent how restrained the United 
States legal response to the terrorist attacks appears.  Although not directly attacked, in passing 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 the United Kingdom enacted detention measures 
much more sweeping than anything found under the Patriot Act.  
Assuming that public safety and a secure and civil society is the primary goal of both the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the detention provisions of the Patriot Act are a well-
reasoned response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  In the face of great stress, the 
American system of checks and balances has worked relatively well to protect the United States 
from another terrorist attack as well as to detain only those non-citizens who pose a legitimate 
threat to the national security of the nation.  That being said, however, the United States 
government should not necessarily be praised for the detention measures found in the Patriot 
Act.  While the American public may have initially supported or at least acquiesced to the 
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, almost two years have passed since the attacks of 
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September 11, 2001.  It is essential for the United States government to be mindful that these 
detention provisions do not have to be permanent and to recognize that they most probably 
should not be permanent.  In other words, it is important to re-evaluate these provisions provided 
the situation stabilizes.  The United States government must remember that even those
emergency measures enacted in previous conflicts that most adversely compromised tradition 
civil liberties—Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, FDR’s internment of Japanese-
Americans—were re-evaluated once the wars were won.430  Quite possibly, if history is any 
indication, the current infringements on the civil liberties of non-citizens in the United States will 
heighten our sensitivity so that our concern for civil liberties in the future will be far greater than 
it is today.431
Conversely, the government of the United Kingdom did not strike any sort of balance 
between protecting the basic civil liberties of non-citizens and guarding against any threat of 
terrorism in the United Kingdom.  Undoubtedly, in passing ATCSA, the United Kingdom had 
the same goals as the United States.  Detaining suspected terrorists using the disproportionate 
detention measures under ATCSA, in the absence of any widely-perceived public emergency, 
however, is not the answer.  ATCSA is not a well thought-out and measured response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Given the United Kingdom’s vast history with 
terrorism, the government was well aware of the alternative means of monitoring suspected 
without denying them the basis principles of liberty and justice.  This Comment is not arguing 
that the government should be denied the powers it truly needs in order to defend the United 
Kingdom’s national security, but these measures need to be strictly necessary, proportionate, 
accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards as well as targeted at a true emergency situation 
430 See Ting, supra note 144, at 1147.
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which they were designed to improve.  Unfortunately, the detention measures of ATCSA fail to 




SEC. 411.  DEFINITIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM
(a) GROUNDS OF INADMISSIBILITY.  Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended–
(1) in subparagraph (B) –
(A) in clause (i) –
(i) by amending subclause (IV) to read as follows:
“(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of–
(aa) a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary of State 
under section 219, or
 (bb) a political, social or other similar group whose public endorsement of 
acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State has determined undermines 
United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities,”;
(ii) in subclause (V), by inserting “or” after “section 219,”; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new subclauses:
“(VI) has used the alien's position of prominence within any country to 
endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support 
terrorist activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of 
State has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or 
eliminate terrorist activities, or
(VII) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this 
section, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred 
within the last 5 years,”;
(B) by redesignating clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) as clauses (iii), (iv), and (v), 
respectively;
(C) in clause (i)(II), by striking "clause (iii)" and inserting "clause (iv)";
(D) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
“(ii) EXCEPTION.--Subclause (VII) of clause (i) does not apply to a 
spouse or child--
(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity 
causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section; or
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(II) whom the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable grounds 
to believe has renounced the activity causing the alien to be found 
inadmissible under this section.”;
(E) in clause (iii) (as redesignated by subparagraph (B)) –
(i) by inserting “it had been” before “committed in the United States”; and
(ii) in subclause (V)(b), by striking “or firearm" and inserting, “firearm, or 
other weapon or dangerous device”;
(F) by amending clause (iv) (as redesignated by subparagraph (B)) to read as 
follows:
”(iv) ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED.--As used in this 
chapter, the term 'engage in terrorist activity' means, in an individual 
capacity or as a member of an organization–
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an 
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;"(III) to gather information on 
potential targets for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for–
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the 
solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably 
have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's terrorist 
activity;
(V) to solicit any individual–
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this clause;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) 
or (vi)(II); or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause 
(vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and 
should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation would further the 
organization's terrorist activity; or
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, 
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial 
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including 
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training--
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, 
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has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor 
can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have 
known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist activity.
This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien afforded to an 
organization or individual that has committed terrorist activity, if the 
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the 
Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, concludes 
in his sole unreviewable discretion, that this clause should not apply”; and
(G) by adding at the end the following new clause:
“(vi) TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DEFINED. As used in clause 
(i)(VI) and clause (iv), the term 'terrorist organization' means an 
organization–
(I) designated under section 219;
(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney 
General, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization 
engages in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause 
(iv), or that the organization provides material support to further terrorist 
activity; or
(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, 
which engages in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of 
clause (iv)."; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
(F) ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.--Any alien 
who the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, 
or the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, 
determines has been associated with a terrorist organization and intends 
while in the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in 
activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United 
States is inadmissible.”.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(1) Section 237(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(B)) 
is amended by striking “section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)” and inserting “section 
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)”.
(2) Section 208(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(A)(v)) is amended by striking “or (IV)” and inserting “(IV), or (VI)”.
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(c) RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments 
made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall 
apply to–
(A) actions taken by an alien before, on, or after such date; and
(B) all aliens, without regard to the date of entry or attempted entry into the 
United States–
(i) in removal proceedings on or after such date (except for proceedings in 
which there has been a final administrative decision before such date); or
(ii) seeking admission to the United States on or after such date.
(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR ALIENS IN EXCLUSION OR DEPORTATION 
PROCEEDINGS.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sections 212(a)(3)(B) 
and 237(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by this Act, shall 
apply to all aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act (except for proceedings in which there has been a final 
administrative decision before such date) as if such proceedings were removal 
proceedings.
(3) SPECIAL RULE FOR SECTION 219 ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
DESIGNATED UNDER SECTION 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)—
(A) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), no alien shall be 
considered inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)), or deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B) of 
such Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(B)), by reason of the amendments made by 
subsection (a), on the ground that the alien engaged in a terrorist activity 
described in subclause (IV)(bb), (V)(bb), or (VI)(cc) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) 
of such Act (as so amended) with respect to a group at any time when the group 
was not a terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State under section 
219 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) or otherwise designated under section 
212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of such Act (as so amended).
(B) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed 
to prevent an alien from being considered inadmissible or deportable for having 
engaged in a terrorist activity-
(i) described in subclause (IV)(bb), (V)(bb), or (VI)(cc) of section 
212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act (as so amended) with respect to a terrorist 
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organization at any time when such organization was designated by the 
Secretary of State under section 219 of such Act or otherwise designated 
under section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of such Act (as so amended); or
(ii) described in subclause (IV)(cc), (V)(cc), or (VI)(dd) of section 
212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act (as so amended) with respect to a terrorist 
organization described in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) of such Act (as so 
amended).
(4) EXCEPTION.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney 
General, may determine that the amendments made by this section shall not apply 
with respect to actions by an alien taken outside the United States before the date 
of the enactment of this Act upon the recommendation of a consular officer who 
has concluded that there is not reasonable ground to believe that the alien knew or 
reasonably should have known that the actions would further a terrorist activity.
(c) DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. Section 219(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) is amended–
(1) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting “or terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 
U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist 
activity or terrorism” after “212(a)(3)(B)”;
(2) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting “or terrorism” after “terrorist activity”;
(3) by amending paragraph (2)(A) to read as follows:
“(A) NOTICE.
(i) TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS.  Seven days before making a 
designation under this subsection, the Secretary shall, by classified 
communication, notify the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of 
Representatives, the President pro tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority 
Leader of the Senate, and the members of the relevant committees of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, in writing, of the intent to 
designate an organization under this subsection, together with the findings 
made under paragraph (1) with respect to that organization, and the factual 
basis therefor.
(ii) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.  The Secretary shall 
publish the designation in the Federal Register seven days after providing 
the notification under clause (i).”;
(4) in paragraph (2)(B)(i), by striking “subparagraph (A)” and inserting 
“subparagraph (A)(ii)”;
(5) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking “paragraph (2)” and inserting “paragraph 
(2)(A)(i)”;
(6) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking “subsection (c)” and inserting “subsection 
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(b)”;
(7) in paragraph (4)(B), by inserting after the first sentence the following: “The 
Secretary also may redesignate such organization at the end of any 2-year 
redesignation period (but not sooner than 60 days prior to the termination of such 
period) for an additional 2-year period upon a finding that the relevant 
circumstances described in paragraph (1) still exist. Any redesignation shall be 
effective immediately following the end of the prior 2- year designation or 
redesignation period unless a different effective date is provided in such 
redesignation.”;
(8) in paragraph (6)(A)-
(A) by inserting “or a redesignation made under paragraph (4)(B)” after 
“paragraph (1)”;
(B) in clause (i) -
(i) by inserting “or redesignation” after “designation” the first place it 
appears; and
(ii) by striking “of the designation”; and
(C) in clause (ii), by striking “of the designation”;
(9) in paragraph (6)(B) –
(A) by striking “through (4)” and inserting “and (3)”; and
(B) by inserting at the end the following new sentence: “Any revocation 
shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication 
in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified.”;
(10) in paragraph (7), by inserting, “or the revocation of a redesignation under 
paragraph (6),” after “paragraph (5) or (6)”; and
(11) in paragraph (8)—
(A) by striking “paragraph (1)(B)” and inserting “paragraph (2)(B), or if a
redesignation under this subsection has become effective under paragraph 
(4)(B)”;
(B) by inserting “or an alien in a removal proceeding” after “criminal 
action”; and
(C) by inserting “or redesignation” before “as a defense”.
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SEC. 412. MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS; HABEAS 
CORPUS; JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(a) IN GENERAL. The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is 
amended by inserting after section 236 the following:
“MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS;
HABEAS CORPUS; JUDICIAL REVIEW
SEC. 236A. (a) DETENTION OF TERRORIST ALIENS
 (1) CUSTODY. The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is 
certified under paragraph (3).
(2) RELEASE.--Except as provided in paragraphs (5) and (6), the Attorney 
General shall maintain custody of such an alien until the alien is removed from 
the United States. Except as provided in paragraph (6), such custody shall be 
maintained irrespective of any relief from removal for which the alien may be 
eligible, or any relief from removal granted the alien, until the Attorney General 
determines that the alien is no longer an alien who may be certified under 
paragraph (3). If the alien is finally determined not to be removable, detention 
pursuant to this subsection shall terminate.
(3) CERTIFICATION.--The Attorney General may certify an alien under this 
paragraph if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
alien—
(A) is described in section 212(a)(3)(A)(i), 212(a)(3)(A)(iii), 212(a)(3)(B), 
237(a)(4)(A)(i), 237(a)(4)(A)(iii), or 237(a)(4)(B); or
(B) is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the 
United States.
(4) NONDELEGATION. The Attorney General may delegate the authority 
provided under paragraph (3) only to the Deputy Attorney General. The Deputy 
Attorney General may not delegate such authority.
(5) COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. The Attorney General shall place 
an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the 
alien with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the commencement of 
such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not satisfied, the 
Attorney General shall release the alien.
(6) LIMITATION ON INDEFINITE DETENTION.--An alien detained solely 
under paragraph (1) who has not been removed under section 241(a)(1)(A), and 
whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained 
for additional periods of up to six months only if the release of the alien will 
threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community 
or any person.
(7) REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION. The Attorney General shall review the 
certification made under paragraph (3) every 6 months. If the Attorney General 
determines, in the Attorney General's discretion, that the certification should be 
revoked, the alien may be released on such conditions as the Attorney General 
deems appropriate, unless such release is otherwise prohibited by law. The alien 
may request each 6 months in writing that the Attorney General reconsider the
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certification and may submit documents or other evidence in support of that 
request.
(b) HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
(1) IN GENERAL. Judicial review of any action or decision relating to this 
section (including judicial review of the merits of a determination made under 
subsection (a)(3) or (a)(6)) is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings 
consistent with this subsection. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, no 
court shall have jurisdiction to review, by habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any 
such action or decision.
(2) APPLICATION. 
(A) IN GENERAL. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section 
2241(a) of title 28, United States Code, habeas corpus proceedings described in 
paragraph (1) may be initiated only by an application filed with--
(i) the Supreme Court;
(ii) any justice of the Supreme Court;
(iii) any circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit; or
(iv) any district court otherwise having jurisdiction to entertain it.
(B) APPLICATION TRANSFER.--Section 2241(b) of title 28, United States 
Code, shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus described in 
subparagraph (A).
(3) APPEALS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section 
2253 of title 28, in habeas corpus proceedings described in paragraph (1) before a 
circuit or district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. There 
shall be no right of appeal in such proceedings to any other circuit court of 
appeals.
(4) RULE OF DECISION.--The law applied by the Supreme Court and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall be 
regarded as the rule of decision in habeas corpus proceedings described in 
paragraph (1).
(c) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.--The provisions of this section shall not be 
applicable to any other provision of this Act.”.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The table of contents of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 236 the 
following:
“Sec. 236A. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorist; habeas corpus; judicial 
review.”.
(c) REPORTS.  Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
every 6 months thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the Senate, with respect to the reporting period, on—
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(1) the number of aliens certified under section 236A(a)(3) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, as added by subsection (a);
(2) the grounds for such certifications;
(3) the nationalities of the aliens so certified;
(4) the length of the detention for each alien so certified; and
(5) the number of aliens so certified who—
(A) were granted any form of relief from removal;
(B) were removed;
(C) the Attorney General has determined are no longer aliens who may be so 
certified; or






21 Suspected international terrorist: certification
(1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section in respect of a 
person if the Secretary of State reasonably-
(a) believes that the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to 
national security, and
(b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.
(2) In subsection (1)(b) "terrorist" means a person who-
(a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of 
acts of international terrorism,
(b) is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group, or
(c) has links with an international terrorist group.
(3) A group is an international terrorist group for the purposes of subsection (2)(b) 
and (c) if-
(a) it is subject to the control or influence of persons outside the United 
Kingdom, and
(b) the Secretary of State suspects that it is concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person has links with an international 
terrorist group only if he supports or assists it.
(5) In this Part-
"terrorism" has the meaning given by section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 
11), and
"suspected international terrorist" means a person certified under subsection 
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(1).
(6) Where the Secretary of State issues a certificate under subsection (1) he shall as 
soon as is reasonably practicable-
(a) take reasonable steps to notify the person certified, and
(b) send a copy of the certificate to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission.
(7) The Secretary of State may revoke a certificate issued under subsection (1).
(8) A decision of the Secretary of State in connection with certification under this 
section may be questioned in legal proceedings only under section 25 or 26.
(9) An action of the Secretary of State taken wholly or partly in reliance on a
certificate under this section may be questioned in legal proceedings only by or in the 
course of proceedings under-
(a) section 25 or 26, or
(b) secton 2 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) 
(appeal).
22 Deportation, removal, &c.
(1) An action of a kind specified in subsection (2) may be taken in respect of a 
suspected international terrorist despite the fact that (whether temporarily or 
indefinitely) the action cannot result in his removal from the United Kingdom 
because of-
(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement, 
or
(b) a practical consideration.
(2) The actions mentioned in subsection (1) are-
(a) refusing leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom in accordance 
with provision made by or by virtue of any of sections 3 to 3B of the 
Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (control of entry to United Kingdom),
(b) varying a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom in 
accordance with provision made by or by virtue of any of those sections,
(c) recommending deportation in accordance with section 3(6) of that Act 
(recommendation by court),
(d) taking a decision to make a deportation order under section 5(1) of that 
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Act (deportation by Secretary of State),
(e) making a deportation order under section 5(1) of that Act,
(f) refusing to revoke a deportation order,
(g) cancelling leave to enter the United Kingdom in accordance with 
paragraph 2A of Schedule 2 to that Act (person arriving with continuous 
leave),
(h) giving directions for a person's removal from the United Kingdom under 
any of paragraphs 8 to 10 or 12 to 14 of Schedule 2 to that Act (control of 
entry to United Kingdom),
(i) giving directions for a person's removal from the United Kingdom under 
section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (person 
unlawfully in United Kingdom), and
(j) giving notice to a person in accordance with regulations under paragraph 1 
of Schedule 4 to that Act of a decision to make a deportation order against 
him.
(3) Action of a kind specified in subsection (2) which has effect in respect of a 
suspected international terrorist at the time of his certification under section 21 shall 
be treated as taken again (in reliance on subsection (1) above) immediately after 
certification.
23 Detention
(1) A suspected international terrorist may be detained under a provision specified 
in subsection (2) despite the fact that his removal or departure from the United 
Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) by-
(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement, 
or
(b) a practical consideration.
(2) The provisions mentioned in subsection (1) are-
(a) paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (detention 
of persons liable to examination or removal), and
(b) paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation).
24 Bail
(1) A suspected international terrorist who is detained under a provision of the 
Immigration Act 1971 may be released on bail.
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(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) the following provisions of Schedule 2 to the 
Immigration Act 1971 (control on entry) shall apply with the modifications specified 
in Schedule 3 to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) (bail 
to be determined by Special Immigration Appeals Commission) and with any other 
necessary modifications-
(a) paragraph 22(1A), (2) and (3) (release),
(b) paragraph 23 (forfeiture),
(c) paragraph 24 (arrest), and
(d) paragraph 30(1) (requirement of Secretary of State's consent).
(3) Rules of procedure under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 
1997 (c. 68)-
(a) may make provision in relation to release on bail by virtue of this section, 
and
(b) subject to provision made by virtue of paragraph (a), shall apply in relation 
to release on bail by virtue of this section as they apply in relation to release 
on bail by virtue of that Act subject to any modification which the 
Commission considers necessary.
25 Certification: appeal
(1) A suspected international terrorist may appeal to the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission against his certification under section 21.
(2) On an appeal the Commission must cancel the certificate if-
(a) it considers that there are no reasonable grounds for a belief or suspicion of 
the kind referred to in section 21(1)(a) or (b), or
(b) it considers that for some other reason the certificate should not have been 
issued.
(3) If the Commission determines not to cancel a certificate it must dismiss the 
appeal.
(4) Where a certificate is cancelled under subsection (2) it shall be treated as never 
having been issued.
(5) An appeal against certification may be commenced only-
(a) within the period of three months beginning with the date on which the 
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certificate is issued, or
(b) with the leave of the Commission, after the end of that period but before 
the commencement of the first review under section 26.
26 Certification: review
(1) The Special Immigration Appeals Commission must hold a first review of each 
certificate issued under section 21 as soon as is reasonably practicable after the expiry 
of the period of six months beginning with the date on which the certificate is issued.
(2) But-
(a) in a case where before the first review would fall to be held in accordance 
with subsection (1) an appeal under section 25 is commenced (whether or not 
it is finally determined before that time) or leave to appeal is given under 
section 25(5)(b), the first review shall be held as soon as is reasonably 
practicable after the expiry of the period of six months beginning with the date 
on which the appeal is finally determined, and
(b) in a case where an application for leave under section 25(5)(b) has been 
commenced but not determined at the time when the first review would fall to 
be held in accordance with subsection (1), if leave is granted the first review 
shall be held as soon as is reasonably practicable after the expiry of the period 
of six months beginning with the date on which the appeal is finally 
determined.
(3) The Commission must review each certificate issued under section 21 as soon 
as is reasonably practicable after the expiry of the period of three months beginning 
with the date on which the first review or a review under this subsection is finally 
determined.
(4) The Commission may review a certificate during a period mentioned in 
subsection (1), (2) or (3) if-
(a) the person certified applies for a review, and
(b) the Commission considers that a review should be held because of a 
change in circumstance.
(5) On a review the Commission-
(a) must cancel the certificate if it considers that there are no reasonable 
grounds for a belief or suspicion of the kind referred to in section 21(1)(a) or 
(b), and
(b) otherwise, may not make any order (save as to leave to appeal).
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(6) A certificate cancelled by order of the Commission under subsection (5) ceases 
to have effect at the end of the day on which the order is made.
(7) Where the Commission reviews a certificate under subsection (4), the period for 
determining the next review of the certificate under subsection (3) shall begin with 
the date of the final determination of the review under subsection (4).
27 Appeal and review: supplementary
(1) The following provisions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 
1997 (c. 68) shall apply in relation to an appeal or review under section 25 or 26 as 
they apply in relation to an appeal under section 2 of that Act-
(a) section 6 (person to represent appellant's interests),
(b) section 7 (further appeal on point of law), and
(c) section 7A (pending appeal).
(2) The reference in subsection (1) to an appeal or review does not include a 
reference to a decision made or action taken on or in connection with-
(a) an application under section 25(5)(b) or 26(4)(a) of this Act, or
(b) subsection (8) below.
(3) Subsection (4) applies where-
(a) a further appeal is brought by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in connection 
with an appeal or review, and
(b) the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that in his opinion the 
further appeal is confined to calling into question one or more derogation 
matters within the meaning of section 30 of this Act.
(4) For the purpose of the application of section 26(2) and (3) of this Act the 
determination by the Commission of the appeal or review in connection with which 
the further appeal is brought shall be treated as a final determination.
(5) Rules under section 5 or 8 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 
1997 (general procedure; and leave to appeal) may make provision about an appeal, 
review or application under section 25 or 26 of this Act.
(6) Subject to any provision made by virtue of subsection (5), rules under section 5 
or 8 of that Act shall apply in relation to an appeal, review or application under 
section 25 or 26 of this Act with any modification which the Commission considers 
necessary.
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(7) Subsection (8) applies where the Commission considers that an appeal or 
review under section 25 or 26 which relates to a person's certification under section 
21 is likely to raise an issue which is also likely to be raised in other proceedings 
before the Commission which relate to the same person.
(8) The Commission shall so far as is reasonably practicable-
(a) deal with the two sets of proceedings together, and
(b) avoid or minimise delay to either set of proceedings as a result of 
compliance with paragraph (a).
(9) Cancellation by the Commission of a certificate issued under section 21 shall 
not prevent the Secretary of State from issuing another certificate, whether on the 
grounds of a change of circumstance or otherwise.
(10) The reference in section 81 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) 
(grants to voluntary organisations) to persons who have rights of appeal under that 
Act shall be treated as including a reference to suspected international terrorists.
28 Review of sections 21 to 23
(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a person to review the operation of sections 
21 to 23.
(2) The person appointed under subsection (1) shall review the operation of those 
sections not later than-
(a) the expiry of the period of 14 months beginning with the day on which this 
Act is passed;
(b) one month before the expiry of a period specified in accordance with 
section 29(2)(b) or (c).
(3) Where that person conducts a review under subsection (2) he shall send a report 
to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practicable.
(4) Where the Secretary of State receives a report under subsection (3) he shall lay 
a copy of it before Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable.
(5) The Secretary of State may make payments to a person appointed under 
subsection (1).
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29 Duration of sections 21 to 23
(1) Sections 21 to 23 shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, 
expire at the end of the period of 15 months beginning with the day on which this Act 
is passed.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order-
(a) repeal sections 21 to 23;
(b) revive those sections for a period not exceeding one year;
(c) provide that those sections shall not expire in accordance with subsection 
(1) or an order under paragraph (b) or this paragraph, but shall continue in 
force for a period not exceeding one year.
(3) An order under subsection (2)-
(a) must be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by 
resolution of each House of Parliament.
(4) An order may be made without compliance with subsection (3)(b) if it contains 
a declaration by the Secretary of State that by reason of urgency it is necessary to 
make the order without laying a draft before Parliament; in which case the order-
(a) must be laid before Parliament, and
(b) shall cease to have effect at the end of the period specified in subsection 
(5) unless the order is approved during that period by resolution of each House 
of Parliament.
(5) The period referred to in subsection (4)(b) is the period of 40 days-
(a) beginning with the day on which the order is made, and
(b) ignoring any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or 
during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.
(6) The fact that an order ceases to have effect by virtue of subsection (4)-
(a) shall not affect the lawfulness of anything done before the order ceases to 
have effect, and
(b) shall not prevent the making of a new order.
(7) Sections 21 to 23 shall by virtue of this subsection cease to have effect at the 
end of 10th November 2006.
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30 Legal proceedings: derogation
(1) In this section "derogation matter" means-
(a) a derogation by the United Kingdom from Article 5(1) of the Convention 
on Human Rights which relates to the detention of a person where there is an 
intention to remove or deport him from the United Kingdom, or
(b) the designation under section 14(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) 
of a derogation within paragraph (a) above.
(2) A derogation matter may be questioned in legal proceedings only before the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission; and the Commission-
(a) is the appropriate tribunal for the purpose of section 7 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 in relation to proceedings all or part of which call a derogation 
matter into question; and
(b) may hear proceedings which could, but for this subsection, be brought in 
the High Court or the Court of Session.
(3) In relation to proceedings brought by virtue of subsection (2)-
(a) section 6 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 
68) (person to represent appellant's interests) shall apply with the reference to 
the appellant being treated as a reference to any party to the proceedings,
(b) rules under section 5 or 8 of that Act (general procedure; and leave to 
appeal) shall apply with any modification which the Commission considers 
necessary, and
(c) in the case of proceedings brought by virtue of subsection (2)(b), the 
Commission may do anything which the High Court may do (in the case of 
proceedings which could have been brought in that court) or which the Court 
of Session may do (in the case of proceedings which could have been brought 
in that court).
(4) The Commission's power to award costs (or, in Scotland, expenses) by virtue of 
subsection (3)(c) may be exercised only in relation to such part of proceedings before 
it as calls a derogation matter into question.
(5) In relation to proceedings brought by virtue of subsection (2)(a) or (b)-
(a) an appeal may be brought to the appropriate appeal court (within the 
meaning of section 7 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 
1997 (c. 68)) with the leave of the Commission or, if that leave is refused, 
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with the leave of the appropriate appeal court, and
(b) the appropriate appeal court may consider and do only those things which 
it could consider and do in an appeal brought from the High Court or the 
Court of Session in proceedings for judicial review.
(6) In relation to proceedings which are entertained by the Commission under 
subsection (2) but are not brought by virtue of subsection (2)(a) or (b), subsection (4) 
shall apply in so far as the proceedings call a derogation matter into question.
(7) In this section "the Convention on Human Rights" has the meaning given to 
"the Convention" by section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42).
31 Interpretation
A reference in section 22, 23 or 24 to a provision of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) 
includes a reference to that provision as applied by-
(a) another provision of that Act, or
(b) another Act.
32 Channel Islands and Isle of Man
Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that sections 21 to 31 shall extend, with 
such modifications as appear to Her Majesty to be appropriate, to any of the Channel 
Islands or the Isle of Man.
Refugee Convention
33 Certificate that Convention does not apply
(1) This section applies to an asylum appeal before the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission where the Secretary of State issues a certificate that-
(a) the appellant is not entitled to the protection of Article 33(1) of the 
Refugee Convention because Article 1(F) or 33(2) applies to him (whether or 
not he would be entitled to protection if that Article did not apply), and
(b) the removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would be 
conducive to the public good.
(2) In this section-
"asylum appeal" means an appeal under section 2 of the Special Immigration 
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Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) in which the appellant makes a claim 
for asylum (within the meaning given by section 167(1) of the Immigration 
and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33)), and
"the Refugee Convention" has the meaning given by that section.
(3) Where this section applies the Commission must begin its substantive 
deliberations on the asylum appeal by considering the statements in the Secretary of 
State's certificate.
(4) If the Commission agrees with those statements it must dismiss such part of the 
asylum appeal as amounts to a claim for asylum (before considering any other aspect 
of the case).
(5) If the Commission does not agree with those statements it must quash the 
decision or action against which the asylum appeal is brought.
(6) Where a decision or action is quashed under subsection (5)-
(a) the quashing shall not prejudice any later decision or action, whether taken 
on the grounds of a change of circumstance or otherwise, and
(b) the claim for asylum made in the course of the asylum appeal shall be 
treated for the purposes of section 15 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999 (interim protection from removal) as undecided until it has been 
determined whether to take a new decision or action of the kind quashed.
(7) The Secretary of State may revoke a certificate issued under subsection (1).
(8) No court may entertain proceedings for questioning-
(a) a decision or action of the Secretary of State in connection with 
certification under subsection (1),
(b) a decision of the Secretary of State in connection with a claim for asylum 
(within the meaning given by section 167(1) of the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999) in a case in respect of which he issues a certificate under subsection 
(1) above, or
(c) a decision or action of the Secretary of State taken as a consequence of the 
dismissal of all or part of an asylum appeal in pursuance of subsection (4).
(9) Subsection (8) shall not prevent an appeal under section 7 of the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (appeal on point of law).
(10) Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that this section shall extend, with
such modifications as appear to Her Majesty to be appropriate, to any of the Channel 
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Islands or the Isle of Man.
34 Construction
(1) Articles 1(F) and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention (exclusions: war criminals, 
national security, &c.) shall not be taken to require consideration of the gravity of-
(a) events or fear by virtue of which Article 1(A) would or might apply to a 
person if Article 1(F) did not apply, or
(b) a threat by reason of which Article 33(1) would or might apply to a person 
if Article 33(2) did not apply.
(2) In this section "the Refugee Convention" means the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28th July 1951 and the Protocol to the 
Convention.
Special Immigration Appeals Commission
35 Status of Commission
At the end of section 1 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 
68) insert-
"(3) The Commission shall be a superior court of record.
(4) A decision of the Commission shall be questioned in legal proceedings 
only in accordance with-
(a) section 7, or
(b) section 30(5)(a) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 (derogation)."
Fingerprints
36 Destruction of fingerprints
(1) In section 143 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (destruction of 
fingerprints)-
(a) subsections (3) to (8) (requirement to destroy fingerprints on resolution of 
asylum and immigration cases) shall cease to have effect,
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(b) in subsection (9) (dependants) after "F" insert "(within the meaning of 
section 141(7))", and
(c) subsection (14) (interpretation) shall cease to have effect.
(2) Subsection (1)-
(a) shall have effect in relation to fingerprints whether taken before or after the 
coming into force of this section, and
(b) in relation to fingerprints which before the coming into force of this 
section were required by section 143 to be destroyed, shall be treated as 
having had effect before the requirement arose.
